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Suimmary  findings
Barth, Caprio, and Levine draw on their new database on  Supervisory power, independence,  and resources;
bank regulation and supervision in 107 countries to  stringency of loan classification; provisioning standaids;
assess different governmental approaches to bank  diversification guidelines; and powers to take prompt
regulation and supervision and evaluate the efficacy of  corrective action.
different regulatory and supervisory policies.  a  Regulations governing information  disclosure and
First, the authors  assess two broad and competing  fostering private sector monitoring  of banks.
theories of government regulation:  the helping-hand  - Government ownership of banks.
approach, according to which governments regulate to  The results raise a cautionary flag with regard to
correct market failures, and the grabbing-hand approach,  reform strategies that place excessive reliance on a
according to which governments regulate to support  country's  adherence to an extensive checklist of
political constituencies.  regulatory and supervisory practices that involve direct
Second, they assess the effect of an extensive array of  government oversight of and restrictions on banks. IThe
regulatory and supervisory policies on the development  findings, which are much more consistent with the
and fragility of the banking sector. These policies include  grabbing-hand view of regulation than with the help ng-
the following:  hand view, suggest that the regulatory and supervisory
* Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of  practices most effective in promoting good performance
banking arid commerce.  and stability in the banking sector are those that force
*  Regulations on entry by domestic and foreign banks.  accurate information disclosure, empower  private sector
* Regulations on capital adequacy.  monitoring  of banks, and foster incentives for private
*  Design features of deposit insurance systems.  agents to exert corporate control.
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Poorly functioning banking systems impede economic progress, exacerbate poverty, and
destabilize economies. Specifically, a substantial literature documents that well-functioning  banks
accelerate economic growth, which in turn alleviates poverty.  Furthermore, there have been an
unprecedented  number of disruptive banking crises in recent decades. '
The staggering scope of recent crises, coupled with evidence on the beneficial effects of
banking systems on economic growth, have generated calls for reforms in bank regulation and
supervision. The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, International Monetary Fund, and World
Bank all now promote an extensive list of "best practices" to be adopted by each and every country
for the regulation and supervision of banks. There is a strong sense that if only policymakers in
countries around the world would implement particular regulatory and supervisory practices, then
bank "safety and soundness" would improve, thereby promoting growth and stability.
There is no evidence, however, that the best practices currently being advocated by
international agencies are best, or even better than alternative standards, in every country. There is no
evidence  that successful practices in the United States, for example, will succeed in countries with
different institutional and political environments. There is no evidence, moreover, that each
regulatory and supervisory practice can be considered as part of an extensive checklist of desirable
best practices in which more checks are better than fewer as opposed to considering regulation and
supervision as reflecting broad views about the role of government in society.
We draw upon our unique, new database [Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001  b)] on bank
regulation and supervision in 107 countries to examine the relationship between bank
regulation/supervision  and bank performance and stability. We: (1) assess different broad
governmental approaches to bank regulation and supervision and (2) evaluate the efficacy of specific
regulatory and supervisory policies. More specifically, we first assess two broad and competing
theories of government regulation. Pigou's (1938) classic treatment of regulation holds that
monopoly power, externalities, and informational asymmetries create a constructive role for the
'On finance and growth, see Levine (1997). On poverty and growth, see Dollar and Kraay (2000).  On the costs of
recent crises, see World  Bank (2000), Boyd, Kwak, and Smith (2000), and Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2001).
1strong helping hand of government to help offset market failures and thus enhance social welfare.
The helping-hand view takes as given both that there are market failures and that the government can
ameliorate these failures. Applied to banking, this view of government considers official supervision
cf banks, limits on bank activities, restrictions on bank entry, and a deposit insurance scheme as
(potentially) appropriate policies that alleviate market failures and improve resource allocation.
Everyone does not share this helping hand view of regulation, however. Shleifer and Vishny
(1998), for instance, argue that governments  frequently do not implement regulations to ameliorate
market failures. Instead, governments implement regulations in a grabbing-hand manner that
supports political constituencies [Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer (2001)]. The
grabbing-hand alternative is based on the assumption that government failure is at least as important
as market failures. Accordingly, the grabbing-hand  theory predicts that countries with powerful
official supervisors, limits on bank activities, and restrictions on entry will tend to have higher levels
of corruption with no corresponding improvement in bank performance or stability. This view
therefore predicts that governments focusing more on empowering private-sector control of banks are
more likely to promote bank development than governments taking a more hands-on approach to
regulation. One might also conceive of an ineffective-hand view of regulation and supervision.
According to this view, even if there are market failures and even if governments demonstrate
exemplary integrity, official regulations and supervisory procedures are generally ineffective at
actually easing market failures. This ineffective-hand  view predicts that stronger official regulation
and supervision, while not necessarily or intentionally contributing to corruption, will not boost bank
performance and stability. 2 While focusing on the helping-hand vs. grabbing-hand taxonomy, we
empirically evaluate many different perspectives on bank regulation and supervision.
Second, this is the first paper to use extensive cross-country data to examine a wide array of
very specific regulatory/supervisory  debates. In particular, we assess the implications for banking-
sector development,  performnance  and fragility of:
2 One  could  introduce the "invisible-hand" view, where the market produces an efficient outcome and in which
government regulations are likely to be ineffective at best and perhaps harrnful to financial sector performnance.
2*  Regulations on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce
*  Regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry
*  Regulations on capital adequacy
*  Deposit insurance system design features
*  Supervisory  power, independence, resources, loan classification stringency, provisioning
standards, diversification guidelines, among others
*  Regulations on information disclosure and fostering private-sector monitoring of banks
*  Government ownership of banks
Economic theory provides conflicting views as to what should be done with respect to each of
these specific regulatory/supervisory  issues. Indeed, economists and policymakers have hotly
debated the merits of these specific policies from a quite diverse set of perspectives. While the
helping-hand/grabbing-hand  taxonomy helps frame each of these debates, the existing theoretical
literature does not unambiguously fit into the helping- and grabbing-hand categories. As a result, we
review the theoretical debates below using a variety of perspectives on bank regulation and
supervision. Thus, even if one rejects the helping-hand versus grabbing-hand taxonomy, this paper
provides the first cross-country evidence on numerous regulatory and supervisory issues.
Methodologically,  this paper examines a comprehensive array of regulatory and supervisory
information  for a broad cross-section of countries at all levels of development and in all parts of the
world. The list of issues we examine is so extensive that some may question the expansive approach
pursued, preferring a more focused examination of each issue. Indeed, a more narrow study may be
more consistent with specific theoretical models that treat one -or a part of one - of the issues
considered here.
There are two crucial advantages to pursuing a broad, methodological approach, however.
First, the salient issues in bank regulation and supervision are so interrelated that one must examine
an extensive array of factors simultaneously to identify those combinations of regulatory and
supervisory policies that produce successful banking systems. It is perilous, for example, to examine
the impact of official supervisory practices without information on the effectiveness of private-sector
monitoring, and vice versa. It is inappropriate, as another example, to examine the relationship
between restrictions on bank securities activities and bank fragility without considering the
3effectiveness of official supervision, and vice versa. As a final example, it is misguided to examine
the importance of a wide array of regulatory and supervisory policies without accounting for the
degree of government ownership of banks. Second, we pursue a comprehensive approach to
examining bank regulation and supervision because it allows us to assess the broad, competing views
of regulation -the helping-hand versus grabbing-hand  approaches - using a wide array of quite
different bank regulatory and supervisory policies in more than 100 countries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the theoretical and policy debates
regarding each of the issues noted above. Section III discusses the data. Section IV presents
regression results and Section V contains conclusions.
II. The Debates  and Current  Evidence
This section discusses seven policy issues. For each issue, we: (I) stress the theoretical and
policy disagreements, (2) frame much of the disagreement in terms of the helping-hand/grabbing-
hand debate, and (3) emphasize that the specific issues are so inter-related that it is difficult to
analyze the separate regulatory/supervisory policies in isolation from one another. This discussion
also motivates the use of various interaction terms in our empirical analyses.
-I.A. Regulations on bank activities and banking-commerce links
There are five main theoretical reasons for restricting the degree to which banks can engage in
secuLrities,  insurance, and real estate activities, or own nonfinancial firms. Indeed, it is these types of
regulations that help define what observers mean by the term "bank." First, conflicts of interest may
arise when banks engage in such diverse activities as securities underwriting, insurance underwriting,
and real estate investment. Banks, for example, may attempt to "dump" securities on or shift risk to
ill-informed investors so as to assist firms with outstanding loans [Edwards (1979), John, John, and
Saunders (1994) and Saunders (1985)]. Second, to the extent that moral hazard encourages riskier
behavior by banks, they will have more opportunities to increase risk if allowed to engage in a
broader range of activities [Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1998)]. Third, broad financial activities and the
mixing of banking and commerce may lead to the formation of extremely large and complex entities
that are extraordinarily difficult to monitor. Indeed, the former head of the International Monetary
Fund, Michel Camdessus (1997), remarked that we are witnessing "... the development of new types
4of financial instruments, and the organization of banks into financial conglomerates, whose scope is
often hard to grasp and whose operations may be impossible for outside observers - even bank
supervisors - to monitor." Fourth, large institutions may become so politically and economically
powerful that they become "too big to discipline."  Finally, large financial conglomerates may reduce
competition and hence efficiency in the financial sector. According to these arguments, a helping-
hand from the government can ease market failures and thereby enhance bank performance and
stability by restricting activities.
There are alternative theoretical reasons for permitting banks to engage in a broad range of
activities, however. First, fewer regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks permit the
exploitation of economies of scale and scope in gathering and processing information about firms,
managing different types of risks for customers, advertising and distributing financial services,
enforcing contracts, and building reputation capital with clients [Barth, Brumbaugh, and Wilcox
(2000) and Claessens and Klingebiel (2000)]. Second, fewer regulatory restrictions may increase the
franchise value of banks and thereby augment incentives for banks to behave prudently. Third,
broader activities may diversify income streams and thereby create more stable banks. Finally, the
grabbing-hand  view holds that governments do not restrict bank activities to ease market failures.
Instead, according to this view, regulatory restrictions promote government power, create a bigger
role for corruption through the granting of exceptions to the rules, and thereby hinder bank
performance  and stability.
While existing empirical studies provide mixed results regarding these theoretical debates,
most of the literature suggests there are positive benefits from permitting broad-banking powers. For
instance, expanded banking powers are associated with a lower cost of capital and less stringent cash-
flow constraints [Berger and Udell (1996), DeLong (1991) and Ramirez (1995, 1999)]. Vennet
(1999), moreover, finds that unrestricted banks have higher levels of operational efficiency than
banks with more restricted powers. In terms of diversification, Eisenbeis and Wall (1984) and Kwan
and Laderman (1999) argue that since profits from providing different financial services are not very
highly correlated,  there are diversification benefits from allowing broader powers. Furthermore,
broad or universal banks did not systematically abuse their powers in the pre-Glass-Steagall days of
the United States [Ang and Richardson (1994), Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1996), and Ramirez
(1995)] or fail more frequently [White (1986)].
5In an earlier study, we found that greater regulatory restrictions are associated with: (1) a
higher probability of a country suffering a major banking crisis, and (2) lower banking-sector
efficiency [Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001  a)]. We found no countervailing positive effects from
restricting banking-sector activities. Regulatory restrictions, for example, were not closely associated
with less concentration and more competition in either the banking or industrial sector, and also were
not closely linked with securities-market  development. 3
This paper expands and improves on past research in four significant ways. First, regarding
banking powers, we now have data for substantially (50%) more countries than earlier. Second, and
more importantly, we assess whether the positive link that was found between regulatory restrictions
and banking crises simply reflects the effects of important omitted variables: namely, the (other parts
of the) regulatory and the supervisory system. Countries with more effective supervisory systems
may impose fewer regulatory restrictions. If this were found to be the case, the positive relationship
between regulatory restrictions and crises we initially found might simply reflect the fact that
countries with weaker supervisory systems compensate by imposing more restrictions on bank
activities. Third, we similarly assess whether our initial finding of a positive link between regulatory
restrictions and crises reflects another omitted variable: namely, the deposit insurance regime
Countries with 'good'  deposit insurance systems -those that do not severely distort incentives toward
greater risk-taking behavior by banks-may  impose fewer regulatory restrictions on the activities of
banks. If so, the positive relationship between regulatory restrictions and crises may simply mean that
countries imposing more regulatory restrictions do this to compensate for inappropriate deposit-
insurance scheme features. Fourth, we assess the helping-hand/grabbing-hand  views: we test whether
regulatory restrictions on bank activities are associated with more government corruption and worse
bank performance and stability.
II.B. Regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry
Economic theory provides conflicting views on the need for and the effect of regulations on
entry into the banking sector. The helping-hand view suggests the government can play a positive
role in screening entry. Since banks play such an important role in an economy, widespread failures
would reverberate throughout an economy with devastating effects. By effectively screening bank
3Thus well-motivated,  helping-hand regulators who read this study could espouse an easing of certain restrictions!
6entry, governments can promote bank stability. Also, some researchers stress the naturally
monopolistic role of banks. Petersen and Rajan (1995), in particular, demonstrate that banks with
monopolistic power have stronger incentives to incur the necessary costs associated with overcoming
informational barriers, which then facilitates the flow of credit to more worthy enterprises.
Furthermore, banks with monopolistic power may possess considerable franchise value, which
enhances prudent risk-taking behavior [Keeley (1990)].'  Thus, there may be a helping-hand role for
the government in limiting destabilizing competition. In addition, regulators may need to limit entry
in accordance with the ability of official agencies to supervise banks. Specifically, since it is costly to
monitor banks and since there are externalities associated with monitoring banks, many private
agents will free-ride, resulting in a socially sub-optimal level of monitoring. Consequently,  official
supervisors  play a crucial and necessary role in overseeing banks, according to the helping-hand
view.
The grabbing-hand view provides a quite different perspective on regulating entry. While
there may exist valid economic reasons for regulating entry, this view stresses the negative impact of
such limits on corruption and economic efficiency. According to the grabbing-hand view, politicians
and regulators use entry restrictions to reward friendly constituents, extract campaign support, and
collect bribes [Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2001)]. Furthermore, an open, competitive banking sector may be less likely to produce powerful
institutions that unduly influence policymakers in ways that adversely affect bank performance and
stability.
Numerous empirical studies exist on banking-market structure, but they overwhelmingly
examine only the United States. Many of these studies find that competition matters for static and
dynamic efficiency improvements [see the reviews by Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Claessens
and Klingebiel (2000)]. Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) provide evidence that when individual states
within the United States created a more competitive (and diversified) banking sector by liberalizing
their branching restrictions, the rate of economic growth within those states accelerated. Furthermore,
Shaffer (1993) finds evidence from an analysis of cross-sectional data for the United States that
4In  contrast, Pagano (1993) shows that departures from perfect competition in credit markets create inefficiencies
that raise the cost of capital for firms and retard growth. Also, competition may stimulate both static and dynamic
efficiency improvements  in the banking sector [see the review by Claessens and Klingebiel (2000)].
7household income grows faster in markets where the banking sector is less concentrated. In contrast,
Petersen and Rajan (1995) find that firms are less credit constrained and younger firms have access to
cheaper credit in the more concentrated banking markets of the United States (It must be noted,
however, that the United States has a remarkably large number of banks.) In a cross-country study,
Demirgiiu-Kunt,  Levine, and Min (1999) find that foreign entry-and in particular the threat of foreign
entry-improves bank performance. In a cross-country, cross-industry study, Cetorelli and Gambera
(2000) show that greater banking-sector concentration exerts a depressing effect on overall economic
growth, though it promotes the growth of industries that depend heavily on external finance.
Besides helping to distinguish between the helping-hand and grabbing-hand views of
government regulation, this paper importantly contributes to the literature on bank competition in
three ways. First, we assess whether countries with greater restrictions on the entry of foreign and
domestic banks have less efficient and more fragile banking systems. This fills a lacuna because
existing studies do not use direct measures of entry policies.'  Second, while not emphasized in the
formal theoretical literature, the impact of competition may depend on the degree of regulatory
restrictions on bank activities and the mixing of banking and commerce, the quantity and quality of
bank supervision, the features of any deposit insurance scheme, capital adequacy requirements,  the
degree of equity market development, and the extent to which government-owned banks play a
dominant role in the banking sector. Given the richness of our dataset, we can now explore whether
the relationships between competition and banking-sector development, efficiency, and stability
depend on these specific factors. Third, the dataset covers a much broader and diverse group of
countries than any previous analysis of the relationship between competition and bank performance
and fragility.
II.C. Regulations  on capital  adequacy
Traditional approaches to bank regulation emphasize the positive features of capital adequacy
requirements [Dewatripont  and Tirole (1994)]. Capital, or net worth, serves as a buffer against losses
5In examining competition, it is important to distinguish between the degree of concentration and the degree of
competition. Indeed, one may simultaneously observe increasing concentration and increasing competition [see, for
example, Shaffer (1993) and Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999)]. Yet, entry policies may matter more than actual entry
in creating a competitive environment [Boot and Thakor (1997, 2000)]. While this is frequently acknowledged, the
absence of data on bank-entry policies means that many studies simply use measures of bank concentration as a proxy for
the competitive environment.
8and hence failure. Furthermore, with limited liability, the proclivity for bank owners to shift toward
higher risk activities decreases with the amount of capital at risk relative to assets [Lamoreaux
(1994)]. With deposit insurance (implicit or explicit), official capital adequacy regulations play a
crucial role in aligning the incentives of bank owners with depositors and other creditors [Benston
(1992), Berger, Herring and Szego (1995), Kaufman (1991), Stevens (2000), Furlong and Keeley
(1989) and Keeley and Furlong (1990)].
Researchers, however, disagree over whether the imposition of capital requirements actually
reduces risk-taking incentives. Moreover, it is extraordinarily difficult -if not impossible -for
regulators and supervisors to set capital standards that mimic those that would be demanded by well-
informed, undistorted private-market participants. For instance, Kahane (1977), Koehn and
Santomero (1980), Lam and Chen (1985), Kim and Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989), Genotte and
Pyle (1991), Rochet (1992), Besanko and Katanas (1996), Blum (1999), Alexander and Baptista
(2001) note that actual capital requirements may increase risk-taking behavior. In a guarded
assessment, Thakor (1996) demonstrates the conditions under which risk-based capital requirements
increase credit rationing, with negative implications for economic growth. Also, Thakor and Wilson
(1995) argue that higher capital requirements may induce borrowers to shift to capital markets and in
the process impair capital allocation, while Gorton and Winton (1999) show that raising capital
requirements  can increase the cost of capital. Thus, theory provides conflicting predictions on
whether capital requirements curtail or promote bank performance and stability. 6
This paper fills the empirical void on the effect of capital requirements by examining the
relationship between capital requirements and bank performance and fragility in a broad cross-section
of countries [for a discussion of studies of the United States, see Berger, Herring and Szego (1995)].
At a time when the existing formal capital requirements are widely viewed as being arbitrary and
inadequate [see, for example, Greenspan (1998) and Caprio and Honohan (1999)], it seems especially
timely and important to examine whether they even matter. Moreover, as emphasized above, we do
not consider the impact of capital regulations on bank performance and fragility in isolation. The
degree to which capital requirements affect bank performance and fragility, for example, is likely to
depend upon the specific features of any deposit insurance scheme [see, for example, Chen and
6For  a recent review of bank capital regulation, see Santos (2001).
9Mazumdar (1994) and Mullins and Pyle (1994)). The detailed and comprehensive  dataset exploited
here permits us to assess the impact of capital regulations while simultaneously  controlling for other
important features of the policy environment.
Before concluding this subsection, we note that capital regulatory policies do not fit easily
into the helping-hand/grabbing-hand  taxonomy. Capital regulations may be designed to align
incentives, and also reflect the 'govermment  knows best' orientation of the helping-hand view, On the
other hand, onerous capital regulations may reflect excessive government involvement, according to
the grabbing-hand view, unless the capital regulations are part of a regulatory package that empowers
private-sector oversight of banks.
II.D. Deposit insurance design
Countries often adopt deposit insurance schemes to provide protection for unsophisticated and
small depositors, who face coordination and free-rider problems. 7 If too many depositors attempt to
withdraw their funds at once, an illiquid but solvent bank can fail. Moreover, monitoring banks is
expensive and there is an externality associated with monitoring to curtail risk-taking behavior.
Therefore, depositors will have a tendency to free ride, so that there is a socially suboptimal level of
monitoring. To ameliorate these problems, a helping-hand proponent would favor deposit insurance
to protect payment and credit systems from contagious bank runs plus  tight official oversight to
augment private-sector monitoring of banks.
Potential gains from a deposit insurance scheme come at a cost, however. Even in the 1930s,
there were concerns that deposit insurance would encourage excessive risk-taking behavior [Barth
(1991)]. Indeed, this argument helped defeat the 150 legislative attempts to institute formal deposit
guarantees prior to the establishment of one in 1933 in the United States! The moral-hazard problem,
which is aggravated by deposit insurance, continues to be a concern today. Thus, even those
subscribing to the helping-hand view may argue that the adverse-incentive costs of deposit insurance
outweigh the benefits. Yet, many believe that official regulation and supervision can control the
7After  the adoption of a national deposit insurance system in the United States in 1934,  in other countries explicit
systems grew slowly for the first 30 years, with only 6 being established. Then adoptions accelerated: 22 formal systems
existed by the 50t anniversary of the U.S. system, about 70 systems were in place by the close of 2000, and many other
countries are planning on adopting an explicit deposit insurance scheme.
10moral-hazard problem, including an appropriately designed insurance system that encompasses
coverage limits, scope of coverage (or the extent of uninsured liabilities), coinsurance, funding,
premia structure (flat fee or risk-based), who manages the funds and how they are motivated, and
membership requirements. 8
This paper contributes to the pressing and ongoing debate on deposit insurance by examining
whether and how the impact of various deposit insurance features depends on the regulatory
framework and supervisory capacity. Recently, Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Detragiache (2000) made a
substantial contribution  to the literature by measuring the effects of the design of deposit insurance on
bank fragility. 9 Without the benefit of data on the overall regulatory framework, however, these
analyses could not control for other regulatory and supervisory features. Given our data, we control
for many other regulatory and supervisory policies in assessing the independent impact of deposit
insurance on bank development and fragility and thereby conduct a more comprehensive analysis
than past studies.
II.E. Supervision
The helping-hand view of government suggests an important, powerful role for official
regulators and supervisors. The line of reasoning essentially is as follows. First, banks are costly and
difficult to monitor. Private agents may not have the ability or incentive to supervise banks and will
attempt to free-ride. Thus, there will be too little monitoring of banks, which implies sub-optimal
performance  and stability. Official supervisors can ameliorate this market failure. Second, because of
informational asymmetries, some argue that banks are prone to contagious and socially costly bank
runs. According to the helping-hand view, government supervision in such a situation can serve a
socially efficient role. Third, since many countries choose to adopt a deposit insurance scheme, this
situation: (1) creates incentives for excessive risk-taking behavior by banks, and (2) reduces the
incentives for depositors to monitor banks. Thus, strong, official supervision will help prevent banks
s Just as Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) show for risk-based capital requirements, it is possible theoretically that
with risk-based deposit insurance a higher risk premia will induce greater risk-taking behavior. Once the (capital
requirement or) risk-based deposit insurance premia is fixed, bankers may respond by taking greater risk in an attempt to
earn their 'required' return. This anomaly depends on limited-liability, as rational bankers would only take this bet if they
can shift losses from greater risk taking to a third party.
9 Briefly, they find that certain design features, such as high coverage limits and scope, having a funded scheme,
and exclusively  public-sector  participation and management all contribute  to a greater likelihood of a crisis and, in weak
11from engaging in excessive risk-taking behavior and thus improve bank performance and stability.
The grabbing-hand view highlights the potential negative implications of powerful
government regulators and supervisors. As noted above, governments with powerful supervisory
agencies may use this power to benefit favored constituents, attract campaign donations, and extract
bribes. Powerful regulators/supervisors, according to this view, will be less focused on overcoming
market failures and more concemed with currying political support and implementing  their own
narrow objectives. Thus, the grabbing-hand view predicts that powerful supervision and regulation
will be positively related to corruption and will not improve either bank performance or stability.
In practice, policymakers and international  institutions debate and make recommendations on
a wide variety of bank regulatory and supervisory practices. In the area of supervisory  resources and
powers, countries assign very different priorities to bank supervision. We have collected data on the
number of supervisors, average tenure of supervisors, legal power of the supervisory agency, and
independence of the supervisory agency. We assess whether the impact of official supervisory
resources, powers, and independence depends on: (a) the extent of private-sector monitoring, (b)
regulatory restrictions on bank activities, and (c) the degree of moral hazard created by deposit
insurance schemes.
In terms of loan classification and provisioning standards, countries have very different
policies concerning the amount of time before a loan is classified in arrears, rules concerning the
percentage applied to problem loans for which provisioning must be made, and the extent to which
provisioning passes through the income statement. This paper assesses the links between
classification and provisioning policies and bank development, performance, and stability.
Countries  also have different rules concerning diversification requirements and restrictions on
intemational lending that may hinder meaningful diversification. Simple portfolio diversification
theory suggests that greater diversification is an effective way to reduce risk and thus fragility. It is
also a simple device to inhibit banks from assuming excessively concentrated risks. Diversification
guidelines and the ability to make loans abroad may be particularly important in small economies.
This research will provide the first comprehensive and detailed cross-country empirical evidence on
institutional  environments, less bank development. Also, see Demirguii-Kunt  and Huizinga (2000) and Kane (2000).
12the importance or implications of making alternative choices among many different combinations  of
regulatory and supervisory practices. These supervisory policies form the core of many policy
recommendations to improve bank supervision. Nonetheless, due to data limitations, there exists no
cross-country evidence on which supervisory practices work best to promote bank performance and
stability.
II.F. Regulations  on easing  private  sector  monitoring  of banks
Many supervisory agencies encourage private monitoring of banks. For instance, supervisory
agencies may require banks to obtain certified audits and/or ratings from international-rating
agencies. Some countries make bank directors legally liable if information is erroneous or
misleading. Some supervisory agencies compel banks to produce accurate, comprehensive and
consolidated information on the full range of bank activities and risk-management procedures.
Furthermore, some countries credibly impose a "no deposit insurance" policy to stimulate private
monitoring of banks.
Over the years, economists have advocated greater reliance on the private sector and
expressed misgivings with official supervision of banks. The grabbing-hand view holds that banks
will pressure politicians who, in turn, can unduly influence supervisors and regulators. Furthermore,
in some countries, supervisors are not well compensated and hence quickly move into banking,
resulting in a situation in which supervisors may face mixed incentives when it comes to strict
adherence to the rules. Also, since supervisors do not have their own wealth invested in banks, they
have different incentives than private creditors when it comes to monitoring and disciplining banks.
Others, however, question placing excessive trust in private-sector monitoring, especially in
countries with poorly-developed  capital markets, accounting standards, and legal systems. Viewed
from a helping-hand perspective, countries with weak institutional environments will benefit more
from official supervisors and regulators containing excessive risk-taking behavior of banks and
thereby instilling more confidence in depositors than would exist with private-sector monitoring. This
view argues that, in weak institutional settings, increased reliance on private monitoring leads to
exploitation of small savers and hence much less bank development.
13This paper examines the relationship between regulatory and supervisory policies designed to
promote private-sector monitoring and bank development and stability,  while controlling for a full
range of regulatory characteristics. We also assess whether private monitoring is particularly effective
in countries with better-developed institutions.
II.G.  Government  ownership  of banks
Economists hold sharply different views about the impact of govermment  ownership of banks
on financial and economic development [LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes,  and Shleifer (2001)]. The
helping-hand view argues that govermment  ownership of banks facilitates the mobilization of savings
and the allocation of those savings toward strategic projects with long-term beneficial effects on an
economy. According to this view, governments have adequate information and sufficient incentives
to ensure socially desirable investments. Consequently, government ownership of banks helps
economies overcome private capital-market failures, exploit externalities, and invest in strategic
sectors. Lewis (1950), Myrdal (1968), and Gerschenkron (1962) specifically advocate government
ownership of banks to promote economic and financial development, especially in underdeveloped
countries.
The grabbing-hand view, in contrast, argues that governments do not have sufficient
incentives to ensure socially desirable investments [Kornai (1979), and Shleifer and Vishny
(1993,1994)]. Government ownership tends to politicize resource allocation, soften budget
constraints, and otherwise hinder economic efficiency. Thus, government ownership of banks
facilitates the financing of politically attractive projects, but not necessarily economically efficient
projects.
In an influential study, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000) piece together data on
government ownership of banks from an assortment of sources. They find that countries with higher
initial levels of government ownership of banks tend to have both slower subsequent rates of
financial-system development and slower economic growth. In a related paper, Barth, Caprio, and
Levine (2001  a) use data on government ownership from Bankscope. We find that greater government
ownership is generally associated with less efficient and less well-developed financial systems. The
data used in these papers, however, do not cover all banks operating in an economy and the degree of
coverage varies across countries.
14Besides using our analysis of government banks to assess the helping-hand/grabbing-hand
views, we make two specific improvements  on existing studies of government-owned  banks. First,
we use data collected from each country's bank regulatory agency. Thus, the data cover all banks and
the definition of "government owned" is consistent across countries. Second, we control for
differences in the regulatory and supervisory environment in assessing the links between government
ownership and bank development, performance, and stability. For instance, we examine whether
government ownership is better than private ownership with a weak regulatory environment.
111.  Data
III.A. The Dataset
We designed and implemented a survey funded by the World Bank to collect information on
bank regulations and supervisory practices for more than 107 countries. Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001b) describe the survey questions and data collection process in detail. The completion of the
survey entailed numerous steps: collecting initial survey responses, reconciling different responses
from different officials in the same country, cross-checking the data with a survey by the Office of
the Comptroller  of the Currency (OCC), which included some overlap in the information requested,
further reconciling any inconsistencies, and checking our data with information collected by the
Institute of International Bankers, and the Financial Stability Forum's Working Group on Deposit
Insurance, which provided input on the accuracy of responses for some deposit insurance systems.
Thus, in numerous cases, we repeatedly communicated with the authorities to obtain accurate
information.
The regulatory and supervisory data are primarily from 1999, with some responses in late
1998 and others in early 2000.10 In some cases, we group the responses to individual questions into
aggregate indexes that we define below.  This paper uses those countries with more than one million
people and confirms the results when restricting the sample to countries with more than 200,000
people. We have made the data available at the following website:
www.worldbank.org/research/interest/intrstweb.htm.
'° Of the 107 responses received, 13 were received in November 1998,  65 were received in 1999,  and 29 in 2000, with 19
15III.B. Variable Definitions
Since Table 1 provides information on the data, sources, and specific survey questions used to
construct the variables for this paper, we only briefly define them here in the text.
1.  Bank Activity Regulatory Variables. We measure the degree to which the national regulatory
authorities in our sample countries allow banks to engage in the following three fee-based
rather than more traditional interest-spread-based  activities:
a.  Securities Activities: the ability of banks to engage in the business of securities
underwriting, brokering, dealing, and all aspects of the mutual fund industry.
b.  Insurance Activities: the ability of banks to engage in insurance underwriting and selling.
c.  Real Estate Activities: the ability of banks to engage in real estate investment,
development, and management.
2. Mixing Banking / Commerce Regulatory Variables.  We construct two measures of the degree
of regulatory restrictiveness on the mixing of banking and commerce.
a.  Banks Owning Nonfinancial Firms measures restrictions on the ability of banks to own
and control nonfinancial firms.
b.  Nonfinancial Firms Owning Banks measures restrictions on the ability of nonfinancial
firms to own and control banks
In addition, we also construct an overall bank restrictiveness variable. It is:
Restrictions on Bank Activities: includes restrictions on securities, insurance, and real
estate activities plus restrictions on the ability of banks to own and control nonfinancial
firms. This variable is constructed by adding the values of l.a., I.b., I.c., and 2.a.
3. Competition Regulatory Variables. We construct two variables to capture the ability of existing
or new banks to enter the banking business.
a.  Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership: whether there are any limitations
placed on the ownership of domestic banks by foreign banks and whether there are any
limitations placed on the ability of foreign banks to enter the domestic banking industry. If
there are any limitations or restrictions, this variable is assigned a value of 1 and a value
of 0 otherwise.
b. Entry into Banking Requirements: measures the specific legal requirements for
obtaining a license to operate as a bank. These might be "prudent" requirements, or
excessive  regulatory barriers, so it remains an empirical issue as to their effects.
of the latter received in either January or February.
16c.  Fraction of Entry Applications Denied: fraction of applications denied.
(1) Foreign Denials: fraction of foreign applications denied.
(2) Domestic Denials: fraction of domestic applications denied.
4. Capital Regulatory Variables. We include three different measures of capital regulatory
stringency.
a.  Overall Capital Stringency measures  the extent of regulatory requirements regarding the
amount of capital that banks must have relative to specific guidelines. We consider several
guidelines to determine the degree to which the leverage potential for capital is limited.
b.  Initial Capital Stringency measures the extent to which the source of funds that count as
regulatory capital can include assets other than cash or government securities, borrowed
funds, and whether the sources of capital are verified by the regulatory or supervisory
authorities.
c.  Capital Regulatory Index incorporates the previous two measures of capital stringency.
It ranges in value from 0 to 9, with a higher value indicating greater stringency.
5. Official Supervisory Action Variables.  We use a variety of variables to capture the degree of
official supervisory oversight of banks.
a.  Official Supervisory Power measures the extent to which official supervisory authorities
have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems.  11
We also essentially decompose this variable into three constituent parts. The resulting three
variables are as follows:
(1) Prompt Corrective Power measures the extent to which the law establishes pre-
determined levels of bank solvency deterioration that forces automatic enforcement
actions such as intervention, and the extent to which supervisors have the requisite.
suitable powers to do so.
(2) Restructuring Power measures the extent to which supervisory authorities have the
power to restructure and reorganize troubled banks.
(3) Declaring Insolvency Power measures the extent to which supervisory authorities
have the power to declare a deeply troubled bank insolvent.
Note that we have slightly changed the definition of the Official Supervisory Power index from our earlier paper. Barth,
Caprio, and Levine (2001  b).  Specifically, in this paper we do not add on the value I for countries in which there are
mechanisms of cease and desist-type orders, whose infraction leads  to the automatic imposition of civil and penal
sanctions on the banks' directors and managers. This supervisory feature seems more of a Prompt Corrective Power
characteristic rather than a supervisory  power trait. This supervisory feature (Question 11.  I in the survey) therefore is
included in the Prompt Corrective Power index. Furthermore, we no longer include Question 8.6 in the Official
Supervisory Power index. Question 8.6 concerns the power of the deposit insurance agency and we include it in the
Deposit Insurer Power index. All of the results reported below, however, are not altered by this change.
17b. Supervisory Forbearance Discretion measures the degree to which supervisory
authorities may engage in forbearance when confronted with violations of laws or
regulations or with other imprudent behavior on the part of banks.
c. Loan Classification Stringency measures the degree to which loans that are in arrears
must be classified as sub-standard, doubtful, or loss.
d. Provisioning Stringency measures the degree to which a bank must provision as a
loan is classified first as sub-standard, then as doubtful, and lastly as loss.
e. Diversification Index measures whether regulations support geographical asset
diversification. It is based on two variables:
(1) Diversification Guidelines: whether there are there explicit, verifiable, and
quantifiable guidelines for asset diversification.
(2) No Foreign Loans: whether banks are prohibited from making loans abroad.
6. Official Supervisory Experience and Structure. We attempt to measure the experience and
structure of the supervisory regime with the following variables:
a.  Supervisor Tenure: This variable is the average years of tenure of professional bank
supervisors.
b. Independence of Supervisory  Authority-Overall: This variable measures the degree to
which the supervisory authority is independent.
1. Independence of Supervisory Authority-Political:  This variable measures the
degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the rest of the
government
2. Independence of Supervisory Authority-Banks:  This variable measures the
degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from lawsuits from
banks and other parties.
c.  Multiple Supervisors: This variable indicates whether there is a single official regulatory
of banks, or whether multiple supervisor share responsibility for supervising the nation's
banks. This yariable is assigned a value of 1 if there is more than one supervisor and 0
otherwise.
7. Private Monitoring Variables.  We measure the degree to which private sector monitoring of
banks influences bank performance and fragility by using four different indicators.
a.  Certified Audit Required: This variable captures whether an outside licensed audit is
required of the financial statements issued by a bank. Such an audit would presumably
indicate the presence or absence of an independent assessment of the accuracy of financial
information released to the public.
b.  Percent of 10 Biggest Banks Rated by International Rating Agencies: The percentage
of the top 10 banks that are rated by international credit-rating agencies. The greater the
18percentage, the more the public may be aware of the overall condition of the banking
industry as viewed by an independent  third party.
c.  No Explicit Deposit Insurance Scheme: this variable takes a value of 1 if there is an
explicit deposit insurance scheme, and 0 otherwise. A lower value would indicate more
private monitoring.
d.  Bank Accounting: this variable takes a value of 1 when the income statement includes
accrued or unpaid interest or principal on nonperforming loans and when banks are
required to produce consolidated financial statements.
e.  Private Monitoring Index: includes (a), (b) [which equals 1 if the percentage is 100; 0
otherwise], (c), and (d). In addition, three other measures are included in the index based
on 'yes or no' answers. Specifically, a 1 is assigned if off-balance sheet items are
disclosed to the public; if banks must disclose risk management procedures to the public;
and if subordinated debt is allowable (required) as a part of regulatory capital. Higher
values indicating more private oversight.
8. Deposit Insurance Scheme Variables.  We use the following three different variables to capture
the effect of the deposit insurance regime:
a.  Deposit Insurer Power: This variable is based on the assignment of I (yes) or 0 (no)
values to three questions assessing whether the deposit insurance authority has the
authority: (1) to make the decision to intervene in a bank, (2) to take legal action against
bank directors or officials, or (3) has ever taken any legal action against bank directors or
officers. The sum of the assigned values ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating
more power.
b.  Deposit Insurance Funds-to-Total Bank Assets: the size of the deposit insurance fund
relative to total bank assets. In the case of the U.S. savings and loan debacle during the
1  980s, the insurance agency itself reported insolvency. This severely limited its ability to
effectively resolve failed savings and loan institutions in a timely manner. In weak
institutional environments, it could also actually increase the looting of institutions [Barth
(1991)].
c.  Moral Hazard Index: based on Demirguic-Kunt  and Detragiache (2000), who used
principal components to capture the presence and design features of explicit deposit
insurance systems, with the latter including: no coinsurance, foreign currency deposits
covered, interbank deposits covered, type of funding, source of funding, management,
membership, and the level of explicit coverage The higher the value, the greater is moral
hazard.
9. Market Structure Indicators
a.  Bank Concentration:  the fraction of deposits held by the five largest banks.
b. Foreign-Owned  Banks: the fraction of the banking system's assets that are 50% or more
foreign owned.
19c.  Government-Owned Banks: the fraction of the banking system's assets that are 50% or
more government owned.
10. Outcomes. To measure bank development,  performance and fragility we use the following
indicators:  12
a.  Bank Development: equals claims on the private sector by deposit money banks and as a
share of GDP and is the average value over the 1997-99 period.
b.  Net Interest Margin: equals net interest income divided by total assets, 1997.
c.  Overhead Costs: equals total bank overhead costs as a share of total banks assets, 1997.
d.  Nonperforming Loans: nonperforming  loans as a share of total assets, 1999.
e.  Crisis: whether a country suffered a major banking crisis according to Caprio-Kiingebiel
(1999) during the 1990s or late 1980s.
III.D. Indexes
Most of these indexes of the bank regulatory and supervisory regime incorporate the answers
to many questions from the survey that we conducted. We list the specific questions in Table 1. We
used two methods for constructing indexes from the underlying questions. First, many of the
questions can be specified as simple zero/one variables as documented in Table 1. Thus, our first
method for constructing the indexes simply involves summing the individual zero/one answers. This
first method means that we give equal weight to each of the questions in constructing the index.
The second method that we use for constructing indexes involves the construction of the first
principal component of the underlying questions. In constructing the first principal component, the
factor analytic procedure a principal component with mean zero and standard deviation one. One
advantage of the principal component method is that we do not specify equal weights on the
individual questions. One disadvantage is that it is less transparent how a change in the response to
one question will change the index.
In the text and tables, we discuss and report the results using the principal component indexes.
We have also conducted all of the analyses using the first method for constructing indexes. The
12 The sources  of the outcome  variables  are as follows.  For bank development,  we extend  the Levine,  Loayza,  and  Beck,
(2000)  database  by using  more  recent  version  of the Intemational  Monetary  Fund's IFS  statistics.  The net interest  margin
and overhead  cost  variables  are from  the Beck,  Demirguic-Kunt,  and Levine  (2001  a) database  on financial  structure.
Nonperforming  loans  are from  this paper's underlying  survey  of bank regulation  and supervision.
20choice of the method for constructing indexes does not alter this paper's conclusions.
III.D.  Summary  Statistics
There is great cross-country, cross-regional, and cross-income group diversity in bank.
regulatory and supervisory practices. For instance, many countries - such as Australia, Austria,
Germany, India, Russia, the United Kingdom, and Zambia impose no restrictions on the ability of
banks to engage in securities activities (Securities Activities). In contrast, Cambodia, China, and
Vietnam prohibit banks or their subsidiaries from conducting securities activities. Also, some
countries during the year prior to the survey had no new banks, including Chile, Egypt, Korea, and
Gambia. Other countries had more than 25 new banks, such as the United States, Italy, India,
Switzerland, Netherlands, Japan, Germany, and Romania. Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b)
illustrate additional cross-country differences.
Table 2 contains correlations. Some key patterns emerge. First, the percentage of the
banking system owned by the government (Government-Owned  Banks) is positively linked with
tighter regulatory restrictions on bank activities (Restrictions on Bank Activities), positively linked
with the percentage of entry applications denied (Entry Applications Denied %), positively linked
with regulatory prohibitions against making foreign loans (No Foreign Loans), and negatively linked
with regulatory variables that promote private monitoring of banks (Private Monitoring Index). Thus,
greater government ownership of banks is associated with policies that restrict bank activities, reduce
bank competition, erect barriers to international financial integration, and that stymie private sector
corporate control of banks.
Second, we expected to find simple regulatory tradeoffs. For instance, we expected  to find
that countries that adopt very generous deposit insurance regimes (high values of the Moral Hazard
Index) would also have very powerful official supervisors, extensive prompt corrective powers,
stringent capital requirements, extensive private monitoring, and perhaps greater restrictions on
bank activities to ameliorate the bad incentives associated with generous deposit insurance. We did
not confirm these expectations. Although the generosity of the deposit insurance regime (Moral
Hazard Index) is significantly correlated with the stringency of capital regulations, it is not
significantly correlated with indexes of Prompt Corrective Power, Official Supervisory Power,
Private Monitoring,  or Restrictions on Bank Activities. Similarly, we did not find that countries
21with higher levels of the Private Monitoring Index had correspondingly  lower levels of Official
Supervisory Power. Rather, the correlations suggest that countries tend to adopt either an open,
private sector oriented approach to regulation and supervision, or they assume a more closed,
government-owned, state dominated approach to the regulation and supervision of banks.
Third, the Table 2 correlations indicate a close correspondence between selected regulatory
and supervisory variables and both government integrity (lower levels of corruption) and the level
of economic  development.  In particular,  corruption  - and economic under-development  -- tend to
be high in countries that have powerful official supervision (Official Supervisory Power). have
weak private sector monitoring, limit entry (Entry Applications Denied), restrict foreign loans, have
high levels of government ownership of banks, restrict bank activities, and have weak capital
regulations. These correlations are consistent with the grabbing-hand view of govermment.  We
now explore the relationship between bank regulation and supervision and both bank performance
and stability in greater detail.
IV. Regression Results
IV.A. Corruption and bank regulation and supervision
The helping-hand and grabbing-hand views of regulation make quite different predictions
about: (a) the relationship between bank regulation/supervision and government integrity or lack of
corruption, and (b) the relationship between bank regulation/supervision  and bank performance. As
noted earlier, the helping-hand view holds that market failures provide an important role for
governments to regulate bank entry, restrict the activities of banks, strictly supervise and regulate
bank behavior, grant deposit insurance, and perhaps own banks to direct credit to strategic sectors.
According to this view, these types of regulatory/supervisory  policies can ameliorate market failures
and enhance bank performance and stability. The grabbing-hand view, in contrast, argues that strong
government regulation and supervision of banks will not ease market failures or improve bank
performance and stability. According to this view, government limits on bank entry, restrictions on
bank activities, powerful official supervision of banks, and government ownership of banks will be
associated with higher levels of corruption but with no compensating improvement in bank
performance. In this preliminary subsection, we run a series of simple regressions to shed some
22empirical light on the helping-hand versus grabbing-hand debate.
To assess the impact of bank regulations and supervisory  practices on corruption, we need to
control for (a) exogenous determinants of government corruption and (b) the potential endogeneity of
bank regulations and supervisory practices. We do this in two steps. First, we use existing theory
and evidence to identify exogenous determinants of government corruption. We include these
determinants as control variables in the corruption-regulation  regressions but without controlling for
endogeneity. Second, we also use instrumental variables to control for simultaneity.
In selecting exogenous determinants of government corruption,  we use La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny's (1999, henceforth LLSV) comprehensive  investigation of the quality
of government. They note that some cultural theories of government quality predict that the Catholic
and Muslim religions tend to produce comparatively centralized, powerful governments with
correspondingly  higher levels of corruption [Landes, 1998; Putnam, 1993; Weber, 1958]. LLSV
(1999) present strong empirical support for these theories. Countries where a high percentage of the
population is either Catholic or Muslim tend to have more corrupt governments than countries
dominated by other religions and especially than those heavily populated by Protestants. Other
theories focus on ethnic diversity [Alesina, Baqir, Easterly, 1999]. In ethnically diverse countries,
there may be a tendency for governments dominated by one ethnic group to expropriate resources
from other ethnic groups with adverse implications for governnent integrity [Easterly and Levine,
19971. Again, LLSV (1999) find a strong positive link between greater ethnic diversity and higher
levels of corruption.  13 Thus, to assess the independent link between corruption and bank regulations
and supervisory practices, we include measures of religious composition (the percentage of the
country that is Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, or another denomination) and ethnic diversity. We also
consider a wide array of other control variables to assess the robustness of the results as we discuss
below.
13 Note, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999) find a strong connection between corruption and both
ethnic diversity and religious composition only when they do not control for income per capita. The very strong link
between corruption and low income per capita is consistent with the view that corruption hinders economic development
[Mauro, 19951.  As La Porta et al (1  999) argue, however, including per capita income in the corruption regression may
spuriously eliminate the connection between corruption and both ethnic diversity and religious composition due to the
impact of corruption  on economic development, i.e., it is inappropriate to add an endogenous control variable. We do not
include income per capita in the regressions for the same reason.
23Table 3 presents regressions on the relationship between government integrity and the
regulation and supervision of banks while controlling for ethnic diversity and religious composition.
The dependent variable in all the regressions is an index of government integrity, with bigger values
signifying less corruption.1 4 To measure ethnic diversity, we use Easterly and Levine's (1997)
measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. It measures the probability that two randoml) selected
people from a given country will not belong to the same ethnolinguistic group. To measure religious
composition, we use LLSV's (1999) measure of the percentage of the population in each country that
is Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, or belongs to "other denominations." The numbers are in
percent and sum to 100. Thus, in the regressions, we include the Roman Catholic, Muslim, and Other
Denomination  variables, while omitting Protestant. The ethnic diversity and religious variables enter
all of the regressions  jointly significantly, which confirms the findings of LLSV (1999). We include
each of the regulation and supervisory indexes sequentially.
The results in Table 3 Panel A are more consistent with the grabbing-hand view of regulation
than the helping-hand view. Greater denial of entry applications, more regulatory restrictions on bank
activities, greater official supervisory power, prohibitions on banks making loans abroad, and greater
government ownership of banks are all strongly, negatively linked with government integrity. In
contrast, regulatory regimes that empower private sector monitoring of banks through information
disclosure have significantly lower levels of government corruption. Government corruption is
essentially unrelated to a dummy variable that takes on the value one when there are multiple bank
regulatory authorities and zero otherwise (Multiple Supervisory Agency). These results are robust to
changes in the control variables. 15
14 The variable Corrupt ranges from 0 to 6, with greater values signifying less corruption, or greater integrity. It is
obtained from the International Country Risk Guide and is averaged over the 1990-99 period.
'5  As a robustness check, we extended the list of control variables in the corruption regressions.  Specifically, LLSV
(1999) note that some theories suggest the civil law countries tend to have more centralized, less competitive political
regimes that are more conducive to government corruption than the more open, competitive political systems associated
with common law countries. They argue that the common law developed to protect private property owners against the
crown and therefore places great emphasis on restraining government excesses. In contrast, Napoleon used the
codification of the French civil law to expand the discretionary powers of the State. LLSV (1999) find that French civil
law countries have higher levels of corruption than Common law countries. We include indicators of legal origin in the
Table 3 regressions. This does not alter the results.  Furthermore, we added a direct measure of political openness, i.e.,
the Political Openness variable discussed on the next page.  While Political Openness is negatively associated with
corruption, it does not change the findings on bank regulations and supervisory practices.
24The sizes of the coefficients are economically  important. For instance, the estimates suggest
that a one standard deviation increase in the Private Monitoring Index is associated with an increase
in government integrity of 0.83 (=(0.83)*(1)), which is about 56% of one standard deviation of the
government integrity index (Corrupt). More concretely, the estimates suggest that if Kenya were to
increase the degree to which its regulatory regime empowered private sector monitoring of banks
from its low current level to that of Chile, it would induce a corresponding reduction in corruption
from its currently very high levels to levels observed in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which are close
to the sample mean. While this type of conceptual experiment should be viewed skeptically,  we
include it as illustrative example of the economic size of the estimated coefficients.
We extend the analyses in a number of ways to assess whether particular political and
institutional settings reduce the positive association between strong official supervision and
corruption. For example, we include an interaction term for the openness of the political system.
The political openness measure is from Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt,  and Levine (2001b) and is an overall
index of the extent of electoral checks and balances on decision makers, the competitiveness of
legislative elections, the influence of special interest groups, and the extent to which the voting
system favors narrow groups. The results in Panel B in Table 3 indicate that countries with more
open political systems ameliorate the corrupting effects of official supervisory power: higher official
supervisory power is negatively associated with government integrity, but this effect is reduced in
more open political systems. For instance, the Panel B regression implies that in a country like Korea
with an intermediate level of political openness (such that Political Openness is approximately 0), a
one standard deviation increase in official supervisory power would induce a decrease in political
integrity of 0.51 (=1*0.509). This is a large enough change to move from Korea's level of political
integrity down to Mexico's.  In contrast, the same increase in official supervisory power in France
(where the Political Openness variable equals 2.7) would actually be associated with an increase in
government integrity, +0.25 (= -0.509*  1 + 0.281*2.7*1). Thus, official supervisory power is
particularly corrupting in countries with closed political systems. Political openness, however, does
not mitigate the pernicious effects of any of the other regulatory and supervisory variables in Table 3
Panel A, such as Entry Applications Denied, Restrictions on Bank Activities, or Government
25Ownership of banks.'6
Besides political openness, we examined an extensive array of additional supervisory and
institutional factors that might mitigate the corrupting influence of official supervisory po,ver and the
pernicious effects of having a restricted banking system. In terms of supervisory structure, we
examined whether greater supervisory independence from the political system, greater supervisory
independence from legal action by banks, greater overall supervisory independence, or having
multiple supervisory agencies reduce the corrupting effects of strong and restrictive regulation and
supervision. We find that neither greater supervisory independence  nor the existence of multiple
regulators ameliorates the positive association between corruption and greater denial of entry
applications, more regulatory restrictions on bank activities, or greater official supervisory power. In
terms of the institutional environment, we examine the openness of the media, both print and
broadcast. Based on the data assembled in Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer (2001), we test
whether countries (a) where the government does not repress the media and (b) where the media is
privately-owned  suffer less corruption from regulation and supervision of banks. Although we
confirm Djankov et. al.'s (2001) findings that corruption is positively correlated with government
ownership of the media and government repression of the media, we do not find that an open,
privately-owned media systematically  ameliorates the corrupting influences of official supervisory
power or restrictions on bank entry.
Next, we use instrumental variables to determine whether controlling for potential
simultaneity bias alters the Table 3 results. To select instrumental variables for the regulation and
supervisory variables, we use theory and recent empirical work that stresses legal systems and natural
resource endowments. LLSV (1998) argue that Common law countries protect private property
rights against the State to a greater degree than Civil law countries. In contrast, LLSV (1998) argue
that the civil law is frequently used to empower the state against private property holders.  Thus,
according to what is known as the law and finance view, civil law countries will tend to have a
hands-on, government-controlled  approach to supervision and regulation, while Common law
countries will tend to rely more heavily on private sector corporate control of banks. LLSV (1999)
show that French civil law countries (as well as Socialist countries) have much lower levels of private
16 Supervisory independence  does not have a different impact depending on the extent of political openness.
26property rights protection than Common law, German civil law, or Scandinavian civil law countries.
Furthermore, leading economists, historians, and bio-geographers emphasize the impact of geography
on economic development and institutions. According to this endowment view, lands with high rates
of disease and poor agricultural yields - such as the tropics - do not support large scale farming,
which is necessary for specialization and consequent institutional development [Kamarck  (1976) and
Gallup, Sachs, and Millinger (1998)]. Thus, according to this endowment view, countries close to the
equator maybe less likely to develop a wide array of institutions associated with supporting private
property and economic interactions. Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt  and Levine (2001b) provide empirical
support for this theory. Thus, as instruments for the regulation and supervision, we use dummy
variables for legal origin and latitudinal distance from the equator. There are five possible legal
origins: English Common Law, French Commercial Code, German Commercial Code, Scandinavian
Commercial Code, and Socialist/Communist  laws. In the regressions, we include dummy variables
for each of these except the Scandinavian  Commercial code countries.  17  Since we assume that the
other variables in the corruption regression (religious composition and ethnic diversity) are
exogenous, they are also included as instruments for the regulatory/supervisory  variables.
The instrumental variable results in Table 4 strongly confirm the grabbing-hand view relative
to the helping-hand view.  After controlling for other determinants of government corruption and
after controlling for potential simultaneity bias, the data indicate that government corruption is
positively associated with the denial of bank entry applications, restrictions on bank activities, official
supervisory power, and government ownership of banks. We also find that corruption is negatively
associated with the extent to which the regulatory regime empowers private sector monitoring of
banks. Furthermore, after controlling for potential simultaneity, we find that greater supervisory
independence  is negatively associated with corruption. Except for the Prompt Corrective  Power, No
Foreign Loans and Multiple Supervisors regressions, the regressions pass the test of the
overidentifying  conditions, i.e., we do not reject that the instruments are appropriate. For these three
regressions,  we have less confidence in the instrumental variable results in that the instruments
explain corruption beyond their association with these regulatory/supervisory indicators.
17 More specifically,  legal origin is the source of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country [LLSV, 1999].
Note, due to data limitations, there are some regressions in which there are no Socialist legal origin countries.
27In sum, the results indicate that empirical support for the grabbing-hand view of bank
regulation and supervision is not due to simultaneity bias.  Moreover, even if one believes thle
direction of causality runs from corruption to regulatory/supervisory  policies and even if one rejects
the instrumental variable results, the findings are still more consistent with a grabbing-hand view of
bank regulation and supervision than with a helping hand view.  That is, corruption goes hand-in-
hand with official supervisory power, restrictions on bank activities, and denial of bank entry
applications.
IV.C. Bank performance and regulation / supervision: Simple Analyses
We examine the relationship between bank development and the regulation/supervision
indicators in Table 5. Table 5 is similar to Table 3 except the dependent variable is Bank
1)e-velopment.  Also, instead of using the religious composition variables and ethnic diversitv as
ccntrol variables, we use the legal origin variables as regressors. As noted earlier, the law and
finance view holds that French civil law countries and Socialist law countries tend to develop strong
governments that limit financial development, while Common law countries (and perhaps to a
somewhat lesser degree German and Scandinavian civil law countries) tend to stress private property
rights and thereby promote bank development.
The Table 5 results do not support the helping-hand theory. This theory predicts that to
alleviate market failures and improve bank performance, governments may restrict foreign-bank
ownership, limit bank entry, restrict bank activities, rigorously supervise banks, and perhaps direct
credit through government-owned banks. In contrast, Table 5 shows that bank development does not
improve with tighter entry regulations, more restrictions on bank activities, greater power of the
supervisory  agency, or a higher degree of government ownership of banks. Great supervisory
incependence, which may proxy for supervisory skills, is linked positively with bank development.  18
Instead, the results in Table 5 highlight the success of governments that empower the private
sector and do not restrict bank activities. More specifically, the results suggest that an overall
18  In many countries, supervisory agencies that are independent are still accountable - i.e., independence shields them
from political forces, not from oversight. However, in some cases, greater independence may be associated with less
oversight and therefore more possibilities for corrupt behavior by the supervisor. For an insightful model of bank
regulations, supervisory  responsibilities, and the problems of having a single regulator, see Kahn and Santos (2001).
28approach to bank regulation that stresses private-sector incentives is associated with greater banking-
system success than an overall approach to bank regulation that emphasizes official government
oversight and regulation of bank activities. Consistent  with the work in LLSV (1998) and the
findings in Beck, Demirgiiu-Kunt,  and Levine (2001  b), the legal origin variables jointly enter all of
the Table 5 regressions significantly.19
We also considered a wide assortment of interaction terms to assess whether the adverse
effects of government control of banks is mitigated in different political and institutional settings.
Panel B in Table 5 indicates that Official Supervisory Power has less of an adverse impact on bank
development in politically open economies. Using the same example as above, the Panel B
regression implies that in a country like Korea with an intermediate level of political openness
(Political Openness is approximately 0), a one standard deviation increase in Official Supervisory
Power would induce a decrease in bank development of 0.09 (=1*0.092). This is a large enough
change to move from Korea's level of bank development down to that of Chile's.  In contrast, the
same increase in official supervisory power in France (where the Political Openness variable equals
2.7) would actually be associated with an increase in bank development, +0.07 (= -0.09*  1 +
0.06*2.7*1). Thus, official supervisory power is particularly harmrful  to bank development in
countries with closed political systems. Besides political openness, we examined whether the same
array of additional political, supervisory, and media factors that we used in the corruption analyses
mitigate the damaging influence of official supervisory power and restrictions on bank activities. As
above, we find that the answer is no.
The instrumental variable results in Table 6 confirm that (a) the denial of entry applications,
regulatory restrictions on bank activities, and government ownership of banks hurt bank
development, while (b) regulations that boost private monitoring of banks and tight capital
requirements  promote bank development.  20  In the instrumental variable results, the coefficient on
Official Supervisory Power becomes insignificant. Nevertheless, the results remain inconsistent with
19 Using alternative control variables does not change these conclusions. For instance, we obtain the same results when
we include the religious composition variables. Furthermore, since Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) demonstrate the rate
of inflation  hinders financial development, we also controlled for the average rate of inflation over the 1985-1998 period
and found that it does not change the Table 5 results.
20 Similar to the corruption  regressions, we use the legal origin dummies, religious composition variables, and latitudinal
distance from the equator as exogenous variables in the Table 6 regressions.
29the helping-hand proposition that Official Supervisory  Power boosts banking sector development.
The Table 6 regressions do not reject the test of the overidentifying restrictions, suggesting that the
instruments are appropriate. Thus, controlling for simultaneity does not substantively alter our
findings.
In sum, when examining the bank regulation and supervisory practice indicators one-at-a-
time, we find that corruption is positively linked with greater denial of entry applications, more
regulatory restrictions on bank activities, greater official supervisory power, and more extensive
government ownership of banks.  Yet, these same "helping hand" policies do not boost performance.
Instead, the empirical results show that regulations that spur private sector monitoring promote bank
performance and lower corruption. We next explore what work best in greater detail.
IV.D. Bank performance and regulation / supervision: Comprehensive Analyses
Tables 7-9 present our basic regression results when simultaneously  including an assortment
of bank regulation/supervision  indicators. There are two types of regressions. First, we use ordinary
least squares regressions to study the links between bank performance and bank regulation and
supervision. In the performance regressions, we regress each of the outcome variables (Bank
Development,  Net Interest Margin, Overhead Costs, and Nonperforming Loans) on each of the
supervisory/regulatory  variables while controlling for other features of the regulatory and supervisory
environment. As above, we include the legal origin variables as control variables in these bank
performance regressions, though we draw the same conclusions when omitting these variables.
Second, we use logit regressions to study the links between banking crises and bank
regulation and supervision. In the crisis regressions, we use logit regressions and investigate the
connections between each regulatory and supervisory indicator and the likelihood of experiencing a
banking crisis while controlling for other features of the policy environment. Since many authors
point to macroeconomic instability as an important determinant of banking crises, we include the
average inflation rate during the five years prior to the crisis in countries that experienced a banking
crisis. In countries that did not experience a crisis, we include the average inflation rate during the
five years prior to the survey, 1993-1997. In many cases, we experiment with interaction terms to
30examine whether the impact of one regulatory or supervisory policy on bank performance and
stability  depends on other features of the institutional and policy environment.
As demonstrated  above, we do consider causality issues in our analyses, but must nevertheless
seriously qualify our investigation of banking crises. The regulatory and supervisory variables are
measured over the 1998-2000 period, but many of the crises occurred throughout the 1  990s. In
earlier work, we did show that restrictions on bank activities have not changed much over the last two
decades [Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2001  a]. We have not been able, however, to construct a time-
series database on the full range of bank regulatory and supervisory policies used in this paper.
We organize the discussion in this subsection around each of the specific policy issues
discussed in Section II. Furthermore, in each case, we focus on only one or two key
regulatory/supervisory  variables. For example, when discussing banking powers, we focus our
attention on Restrictions on Bank Activities, which is an aggregate measure of regulatory restrictions
on bank activities. Nevertheless, we have examined each of the components of the indexes (see
Appendix available on request). In cases where the individual components produce different results
from the aggregate index, we discuss these below.
1. Regulations  on bank activities and banking-commerce links
The empirical results in Table 7 indicate that restricting banking activities is negatively
associated with bank development (Bank Development).  The variable, Restrictions on Bank
Activities, is an aggregate index of the extent to which regulations restrict banks from conducting
securities, insurance, and real estate activities and from owning nonfinancial firms. The negative link
between this regulatory variable and bank performance holds while controlling for the stringency of
capital regulations, official supervisory power, the private monitoring index, regulations on the entry
of new banks, and government ownership of banks. Bank development is a particularly important
indicator to examine because Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) find that this variable exerts a positive
impact on economic growth. 2 '
The size of the coefficient is economically large. For instance, the coefficients suggest that in
21 For more on finance and growth, see King and Levine (1993a,b), Levine and Zervos (1998), Demirgu,c-Kunt  and
31a country like Egypt that imposes many restrictions on bank activities (i.e. its value is more than one
standard deviation above the mean, 1.2), a loosening of restrictions on bank activities such that
restrictions fell to the sample mean (0) would increase bank development by 0.14(=1.2*0.118).  This
would increase Egypt's bank development from 0.49 to 0.63, which is about the level in Italy (whose
restrictions index is about equal to the mean value of zero. Again, we do not present this as an
exploitable policy experiment but rather as an indicator of the economic size of the coefficient.  We
also examine the effects of the individual components of the aggregate Restrictions on Bank
Activities index. These results are available on request. The results indicate that restricting banks
from engaging in securities activities is strongly, negatively associated with less bank development.
The results also provide qualified support for the view that restricting bank activities tends to
increase the likelihood of suffering a major crisis (Table 8). Specifically, in the full sample, we find a
weak, positive link between the likelihood of a crisis and restricting bank activities (Regression 1).
The ability of banks to stabilize income flows by diversifying activities, however, may only work in
countries with some basic level of securities market development. When restricting the sarnple  to
countries where the International Finance Corporation (of the World Bank) has been able to collect at
least some data on stock market transactions, we find that greater regulator restrictions (Restrictions
on Bank Activities) are indeed positively associated with the likelihood of suffering a crisis
(Regression 2).  Thus, the results are consistent with the view that diversification of income sources
through nontraditional bank activities tends to be positively associated with bank stability, especially
in economies with active nonbank-financial markets.
Regarding interaction terms, we assessed whether other regulatory/supervisory  policies and
institutional factors affect the impact of regulatory restrictions on bank activities on bank
performance and stability. For example, Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1998) show that restricting bank
activities may reduce financial fragility in the presence of a generous deposit insurance regime. Thus,
we entered an interaction term into the regressions in Table 7 and those in Table 8 that equals
Restrictions on Bank Activities * Moral Hazard Index, where Moral Hazard Index is the Demirgiiu-
Kunt and Detragiache (2000) measure of deposit insurance generosity. The conclusions do not
change. The Index, Restrictions on Bank Activities, retains its negative association with bank
Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Wurgler (2000).
32performance,  and its positive association with the likelihood of a crisis and the interaction terms are
not significant. 22 Thus, the evidence is consistent with the view that there are diversification  benefits
from allowing banks to engage in an assortment of activities.
2. Regulations on domestic and foreign bank entry
Table 7 indicates that tighter restrictions on entry into banking tend to increase overhead
costs. Consistent with recent work by Levine (1999) and Demirgiu,-Kunt  and Levine (2000) that use
different datasets. we find that although regulatory restrictions on competition influence bank
performance,  there is no link between bank performance and the actual level of bank concentration.
Specifically, when we include the actual level of bank concentration in the Table 7 regressions
instead of the Entry into Banking Requirements Index, bank concentration is not significantly
associated with the bank performance measures (see Appendix available on request). The impact on
bank efficiency from restricting entry, however, is economically  small.  For instance a one standard
deviation increase in Entry into Banking Requirements Index would increase the overhead cost to
total bank assets ratio (Overhead) by only 0.003 (=1  *0.003), which is small since the mean value of
Overhead is 0.039 and the standard deviation is 0.023.
Table 8 indicates that the likelihood of a major banking crisis is positively associated with
greater limitations on foreign-bank participation (Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership).
Consistent  with Demirgiiu-Kunt,  Levine, and Min (1999), we find that foreign-bank ownership per se
is not critically linked to the likelihood of a crisis (see Appendix available on request). Rather, it is
limitations on foreign-bank entry and ownership that are positively associated with bank fragility. 23
WNe  examine whether restricting bank entry produces positive effects in particular institutional
environments. Specifically, we assess whether there are positive benefits in terms of bank
performance and stability to restricting bank entry - both domestic and foreign bank entry -under
22 We also experimented with an interaction term that equals Restrictions  on Bank Activities * Corrupt. The reason is that
some may argue that in corrupt environments it is important to limit the range of permissible bank activities. Our results
do not support this suspicion. We continue to find a negative association between Restrictions on Bank Activities and
both bank performance  and stability when including Restrictions on Bank Activities*Corrupt,  with this interaction term
entering insignificantly.
23  See Rajan and Zingales (2001) and Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2001b) for a discussion of openness and
financial sector development.
33corrupt regimes or with weak official supervision. Specifically, we examine the following interaction
terms (Entry into Banking Regulations)*(Corrupt),  (Entry into Banking Regulations)*(Official
Supervisory Power), (Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership)*(Entry  into Banking
Regulations), and (Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership)*(Official  Supervisory Power).
Furthermore, we also examine the political openness and media openness variables discussed above
and obtain similar results. We find no evidence that restricting bank entry enhances performance or
stability under any of these institutional settings.
3. Regulations  on capital adequacy
There is not a robust relationship between capital regulatory restrictiveness and bank
development, net interest margins, overhead costs, or nonperforming loans as shown in Table 7. In
terms of bank fragility, there is not a robust link between capital regulations and crises when
controlling for other characteristics of the regulatory and supervisory environment (Table 8). There
are specifications in which capital regulatory stringency enters with a negative coefficient and it
sometimes enters with a t-statistic greater than two. Nevertheless, alterations in the conditioning
information set suggest that this relationship is fragile, insofar as small changes in the other
regressors importantly influence the confidence interval around the capital stringency variable.
We also examine whether more stringent capital regulations produce positive effects in
particular policy environments. In particular, strict capital adequacy regulations may be particularly
important in countries with very generous deposit insurance regimes. As we show below, we find no
evidence for the proposition that official regulatory restrictions ameliorate the risk-taking incentives
produced by generous deposit insurance.
While consistent with some of the theoretical models discussed earlier, this finding
contradicts conventional wisdom and the current focus of policy advice being advanced by
international  agencies. These results do not suggest that bank capital is unimportant for bank fragility.
They do, however, suggest that there is not a strong relationship between the stringency of official
capital requirements  and the likelihood of a crisis after controlling for other features of the regulatory
and supervisory regime.
344. Deposit insurance design
We do not find a strong link between the generosity of the deposit insurance system (Moral
Hazard Index) and bank development (Tables 5-7).  This is different from the findings in Cull,
Senbet, and Sorge (2000), using a different estimation procedure and a different dataset.
We find a very strong and robust link between the generosity of the deposit insurance system
and bank fragility (Table 8). This is consistent with recent work by Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache
(2000). Countries with more generous deposit insurance schemes have a much higher likelihood of
suffering a major banking crisis. The positive relationship between the generosity of the deposit
insurance regime and the likelihood  of suffering a crisis is robust to alterations in the control
variables as we show below.  This result is consistent with the view that deposit insurance not only
substantially  aggravates moral hazard but also produces deleterious  effects on bank fragility. The
results, moreover, suggest that the adverse incentive effects from deposit insurance overwhelm any
stabilizing effects.
The impact of generous deposit insurance on bank fragility  is economically large. For
instance, if we use regression 3 in Table 8 and compute the drop in the probability of a banking crisis
from Mexico reducing its very generous deposit insurance scheme (3.9) to the sample mean (about
0), then Mexico's probability of a crisis would fall by 12 percent. We compute the probability using
Mexico's values for all of the variables in regression 3 of Table 8. This illustrative example suggests
that the incentive effects created by overly generous deposit insurance are not merely a theoretical
consideration.
Regarding interaction effects, we carefully assess whether other policy actions ameliorate the
negative effects of generous deposit insurance. For instance, the helping-hand view holds that the
moral hazard effects of deposit insurance can be counteracted by rigorous official oversight of banks
and tight capital regulations. Others disagree, having less faith in official monitoring of banks and
greater faith in private-sector monitoring of banks. Table 9 presents further evidence that is
inconsistent with the helping-hand view. Official supervisory power and tighter capital regulations do
not mitigate the negative impact of generous deposit insurance on bank fragility. However, better-
developed private property rights - as proxied by greater adherence  to the rule of law (Rule of Law) -
35and greater political openness mitigate the adverse impact of moral hazard on bank fragility. 24 It is
worth noting, however, that the generosity of the deposit insurance regime increases the probability
of suffering a crisis even in countries with the highest Rule of Law values (e.g., the cross-over point
is Rule of Law =7.4, but the maximum Rule of Law value is 6). Thus, while greater Rule of Law
reduces the destabilizing effects of generous deposit insurance, it does not eliminate it.
5. Supervision
In contrast to the helping-hand view of government, the main message that emerges from our
study encompassing  a large number of official supervisory policies is that we were not able to
identify a strong connection between bank performance and official supervision (see Tables 5-7).
Specifically,  the overall official supervisory power indicator is not related to bank development or
bank efficiency or the level of nonperforming loans. Declaring insolvency power is also unrelated to
development  or efficiency. The prompt corrective power indicator is negatively related to bank
development  (but these results are not robust to changes in the conditioning information set nor do
we get this negative relationship when controlling for endogeneity). There is some weak evidence
that supervisory forbearance discretion is positively related to bank efficiency (but this is not robust
either). There is, moreover, a positive link between supervisory tenure and bank development.
Supervisory independence, loan classification stringency, liquidity requirements, diversification
guidelines, and restrictions on making loans abroad are not related to bank development or efficiency
or the level of nonperforming loans (see Appendix available on request). In sum, those features of
official "core" supervision are not strongly linked to bank development, bank efficiency, and the
level of nonperforming loans in a predictable, convincing manner.
In terms of banking crises, the same basic message emerges with only one exception (Table
8). Official supervisory power, declaring insolvency power, loan classification stringency, and
supervisor are all unrelated to the likelihood of a crisis. In turn, prompt corrective power and
provisioning  stringency are unrelated to the likelihood of a crisis.
The one exception involves the diversification index (which aggregates diversification
24 The Rule of Law is an indicator of the degree to which the country adheres to the rule of law. It ranges from 0 to 6 with
higher values indicating greater confidence in the legal system to settle disputes. It is obtained from the International
36guidelines and the absence of restrictions on making loans abroad). There is a negative relationship
between the diversification index and the likelihood of suffering a major crisis in small economies.
Specifically, we include the diversification index and an interaction term. The interaction term equals
the diversification index multiplied by the logarithm of real per capita GDP in 1995 (these are
Purchasing Power Parity adjusted figures from the Penn World Tables.). As shown in Table 8,
diversification is negatively associated with the likelihood of a crisis but diversification guidelines
have less of a stabilizing effect in bigger countries. The cut-off is high; diversification  guidelines
have stabilizing effects in all but the nine largest countries.
One may, of course, argue that we do not have sufficiently detailed information on (a)
regulatory and supervisory policies, (b) the actual implementation of those policies (except as noted
the possibility that independence may proxy for the vigor with which policies are implemented),  or
(c) the transparency and accountability of the supervisory process to evaluate cross-country
differences in regulatory and supervisory regimes. This argument, however, still leads to the
conclusion that even very extensive checklists of regulatory and supervisory practices will be
insufficient  to boost bank performance and stability. Moreover, these arguments - in conjunction
with this paper's results - strongly imply that the designers of regulatory/supervisory  systems must
pay close attention to how the individual components of the regulatory and supervisory  regime
influence both the incentives and the ability of the private sector to exert sound corporate control on
banks.
6. Regulations  on easing  private-sector  monitoring  of banks
Private monitoring is strongly positively linked with bank development and negatively
associated with net interest margins and the level of nonperforming loans (Table 7). The relationship
is economically  large. For instance, a one standard increase in the Private Monitoring Index in a
country like Bangladesh with both weak private monitoring and low bank development (0.28), would
increase bank development by about 32% (= (0.09* 1/0.28)*  100).
In terms of crises, there is not much of a link between private-sector monitoring and the
likelihood of a banking crisis when controlling for other variables (Table 8).  Since capital
Country Risk Guide and is averaged over 1990-1999.
37regulations are a possible vehicle for encouraging prudent behavior by owners, we decided to exclude
the capital regulation index from the crisis regressions. Eliminating the capital regulation index does
not change the results, however.
Again, the results emphasize that those economies facilitating private-sector monitoring of
banks have better performing banks than countries less focused on empowering private-sector
corporate control of banks. Taken together with the results of official supervisory power, the results
are less consistent with theories emphasizing direct government oversight and more consistent with
theories emphasizing private-sector corporate control.
7. Government ownership of banks
In terms of the direct relationship between bank performance and government ownership of
banks, Table 7 indicates that government ownership is generally positively related to the level of
nonperforming loans in an economy but not robustly linked with the other performance indicators.
We find  the same results when examining the individual component of the Official Supervisory
Power Index.
We do not find a strong, positive relationship between government ownership and the
likelihood of a crisis (Tables 8). These results do not confirm those in Caprio and Martinez (2000),
who find that government ownership of banks significantly increases bank fragility. However, we
have only examined  the cross-country relationship between government ownership and crises. In
contrast, they use a cross-country, time-series panel. Unfortunately, we do not have time-series
observations on the regulatory and supervisory variables.
38V. Conclusions
Based on our survey of regulatory and supervisory policies in 107 countries, this paper makes
two contributions. First, we assess two broad theories of bank regulation and supervision. The
helping-hand view holds that governments implement rigorous, official oversight of bank activities to
alleviate market failures and thereby enhance bank performance and stability. In contrast, the
grabbing-hand view holds that countries that implement rigorous, official oversight of banks produce
higher levels of government corruption without a corresponding improvement in bank performance or
stability. Second, this is the first paper to examine an extensive list of specific regulatory/supervisory
policy debates for a broad cross-section of countries. Since the central issues in bank regulation and
supervision are interrelated, our comprehensive dataset makes it possible to conduct a unified
assessment of bank regulation and supervision.
The results are generally inconsistent with the helping-hand view of regulation and more
consistent with the grabbing-hand view of government. In contrast to the helping-hand view, tighter
entry regulations, restrictions on bank activities, powerful supervisory agencies, deposit insurance,
and  government ownership  of  the  banking  industry  are  not  positively  associated  with  bank
performance or stability. Indeed, the findings are more consistent with the grabbing-hand view.
Regulatory barriers to  bank  entry, regulatory restrictions on bank  activities, greater supervisory
power, and government ownership of banks are positively associated with government corruption.
This  is  consistent  with  the  grabbing-hand  argument  that  strong  government  regulation  and
supervision will not focus on easing market failures and improving bank performance and stability.
Interestingly, greater political openness does mitigate the impact of increasing supervisory powers,
both in terms of the impact of the latter on corruption and  bank development, but  only where
openness is particularly advanced; for most countries, greater supervisory powers go with greater
corruption and worse outcomes for bank development.  This is a nice illustration of the need for
caution in exporting 'best practices' from industrial to emerging market countries, as weaknesses in
emerging market institutions may literally turn the results on their head.
The evidence suggests that regulatory and supervisory strategies that focus on empowering
the private sector and limiting the adverse incentive effects from generous deposit insurance work
best to promote bank performance and stability. Countries without excessively generous official
deposit insurance regimes have greater bank development and less bank fragility. Countries that
39impose fewer regulatory restrictions on bank activities enjoy better bank performance and a lower
probability of suffering a major banking crisis. Countries that do not impose severe limits on foreign-
bank entry enjoy greater banking-sector stability. Countries with policies that promote private
monitoring of banks have better bank performance. Thus, the results are consistent with the view that
legal and regulatory reforms that promote and facilitate private monitoring of financial institutions
offer a useful financial reform strategy.
The paper also assesses particular regulatory and supervisory practices. First, restricting bank
activities is negatively associated with bank performance and stability, as compared to when banks
can diversify into other financial activities. While theory provides conflicting  predictions about the
implications of restricting the range of bank activities, the results are consistent with the view that
broad banking powers allow banks to diversify income sources and enhance stability. This finding,
moreover, is not due to reverse causality [(Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001  a)]. Furthermore, since we
control for official supervisory procedures, capital regulations, regulations on competition,
government ownership of banks, and the moral hazard engendered by generous deposit insurance
schemes, the negative relationship between restricting bank activities and bank performance and
stability does not seem to be due to an obvious omitted variable. Furthermore, we find no evidence
that restricting  bank activities produces positive results in economies that offer more generous deposit
insurance.
Second, fewer barriers to foreign-bank participation enhance bank stability. Critically, it is not
the actual level of foreign presence (or bank concentration). Rather, it is the contestability of the
market that is positively linked with bank stability.
Third, the stringency of capital regulations is not very closely linked with bank performance
or stability. Our findings are consistent with recent studies that offer a more cautious assessment of
the beneficial effects of capital regulations.
Fourth, generous deposit insurance schemes are very strongly and negatively linked with bank
stability. While many believe that effective regulation and supervision can mitigate the moral hazard
produced by generous deposit insurance, the evidence runs contrary to this belief.
Fifth, with but one exception, we do not find a strong connection between a large number of
40official supervisory indicators and bank performance and stability. Thus, measures of supervisory
power, resources, independence, loan classification stringency,  provisioning stringency, etc., are not
robustly linked with bank performance or stability. Again, these results are counter to the strategy of
many international agencies that focus on empowering official supervisory oversight of bank
practices. The one exception involves diversification. There is a negative relationship between the
diversification index (which aggregates diversification guidelines and the absence of restrictions on
making loans abroad) and the likelihood of suffering a major crisis, especially in small economies.
The old adage, "don't put all your eggs in one basket," remains relevant for modem banking policy.
Sixth, regulations that encourage and facilitate private monitoring of banks tend to boost bank
performance and reduce cogption.
Finally, government ownership of banks is negatively associated with good outcomes and
positively linked with corruption. There is no evidence, even in under-developed economies, that
government-owned  banks overcome market failures and channel credit to productive ends.
These findings raise a cautionary flag regarding reform strategies that place excessive reliance
on countries adhering to an extensive checklist of regulatory and supervisory practices that involve
direct, government oversight of and restrictions on banks.  Instead, this paper's findings suggest that
regulatory and supervisory  practices that (1) force accurate information disclosure, (2) empower
private-sector corporate control of banks, and (3) foster incentives for private agents to exert
corporate control work best to promote bank performance and stability. Our results do not suggest
that official regulation and supervision are unimportant. Indeed, the paper stresses that regulations
and supervisory practices that force accurate information disclosure and limit the moral hazard
incentives of poorly designed deposit insurance critically boost bank performance and stability. Yet,
this paper's results emphasize that a strategic approach to bank regulation that stresses private-sector
monitoring of banks tends to be associated with greater banking-system success than strategies that
place excessive emphasis on direct official government oversight of and restrictions on banks.
41References
Alesina, A., R. Baqir and W.Easterly (1999). "Public Goods and Ethic Divisions," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 114 (November):  1243-1284.
Alexander, G.J. and A. M. Baptista (2001). "A VaR-Constrained Mean-Variance  Model: Imp]  ications
for Portfolio Selection and the Basle Capital Accord," University of Minnesota, mimeo.
Ang, J. S., and T. Richardson (1994). "The Underpricing Experience of Commercial Bank Affiliates
Prior to the Glass-Steagall Act: A Re-examination of Evidence for Passage of the Act," Journal
of Banking and Finance 18, 351-95.
Barth, J.R. (1991). The Great Savings and Loan Debacle, The AEI Press: Washington, D.C.
Barth, J. R.; R. D. Brumbaugh, and J. A. Wilcox (2000). "The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent
of Broad Banking," Journal of Economic Perspectives 14(2), Spring, 191-204.
Barth, J.R., G. Caprio Jr., and R. Levine. (2001  a). "Banking Systems Around the Globe: Do
Regulations and Ownership Affect Performnance  and Stability?" in Frederic S. Mishkin, Editor:
Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn 't, University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Barth, J.R., G. Caprio Jr., and R. Levine (200 lb). "The Regulation and Supervision of Bank Around
the World: A New Database," in Robert E. Litan and Richard Herring, Editors, Integrating
Emerging Market Countries into the Global Financial Systeml Brookings-Wharton Papers on
Financial Services, Brookings Institution Press.
Beck, T.; A. Demirguic-Kunt,  and R. Levine (200 Ia). "A New DataBase on Financial Development
and Structure," World Bank Economic Review. 14(3), 597-605.
Beck, T., A. Demirguic-Kunt,  and R. Levine (200 lb). "Law, Politics, and Finance," University of
Minnesota (Carlson School of Management), mimeo.
Benston, G. J. (1992). "The Purpose of Capital for Institutions with Government-Insured  Deposits."
Journal of Financial Services Research 5, 369-384.
Berger, A. and G. Udell "Universal Banking and the Future of Small Business Lending," in I. Walter
and A. Saunders, Editors, Universal Banking: Financial System Design Reconsidered, Chicago,
IL: Irwin, 559-627.
Berger, A. N; R. S Demsetz, and P.E. Strahan (1  999). "The Consolidation of the Financial Services
Industry: Causes, Consequences, and Implications for the Future," Journal of Banking and
Finance 23, 135-194.
Berger, A. N.; and D. B. Humphrey (1997). "Efficiency of Financial Institutions: International Survey
and Direction for Future Research," European Journal of Operations Research 98, 175-194.
Berger, A. N., R. J. Herring, and G. P. Szego (1995). "The Role of Capital in Financial Institutions,"
Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 257-276.
42Besanko, D. and G. Kanatas (1996). "The Regulation of Bank Capital: Do Capital Standards Promote
Bank Safety?" Journal of Finance Intermediation 5(4), 160-83.
Blum, J. (1999). "Do Capital Adequacy Requirements Reduce Risks in Banking?" Journal of Banking
& Finance 23, 755-771.
Boot, A.W.A. and A.V. Thakor (1997). "Financial System Architecture," Review of Financial Studies
10(3), Fall, 693-733.
Boot, A.W.A. and A.V. Thakor (2000). "Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?" Journal of
Finance 55(2), April, 679-713.
Boyd, J. H.; C. Chang, and B.D. Smith (1998). "Moral Hazard Under Commercial and Universal
Banking," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30(3.2), 426-468.
Boyd, J.H.; S. Kwak, and B.D. Smith (2000). "Banking Crises: What Comes After?," University of
Minnesota (Carlson School of Management), Department of Finance, mimeo.
Boyd, J H.; Levine, Ross; and Smith, Bruce D. (2001). "The Impact of Inflation on Financial Sector
Performance," Journal of Monetary Economics.
Camdessus, M., (1997). "The Challenges of a Sound Banking System," in C. Enoch and J.H. Green,
Editors, Banking Soundness and Monetary Policy, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary
Fund, 535-539.
Caprio, G. Jr., and D. Klingebiel (1999). "Episodes of Systemic and Borderline Financial Crises,"
World Bank, mimeo.
Caprio, G. Jr., and P. Honohan (1999). "Restoring Banking Stability: Beyond Supervised Capital
Requirements," Journal of Economic Perspectives 13:4, 43-64.
Caprio, G. Jr., and Martinez (2000). "Avoiding Disaster: Policies to Reduce the Risk of Banking
Crises," World Bank mimeo and Egyptian Center for Economic Studies Working Paper No. 47.
Cetorelli, N. and M. Gambera (2000). "Banking Market Structure, Financial Dependence and Growth:
International Evidence from Industry Data," Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Chen, A. H., and S. C. Mazumdar (1994). "Impact of Regulatory Interactions on Bank Capital
Structure," Journal of Financial Services Research 8, 283-300.
Claessens, S. and D. Klingebiel (2000). "Competition and Scope of Activities in Financial Services,"
Washington  D.C.: World Bank, mimeo, April.
Cull, R., L. Senbet, and M. Sorge (2000). "Deposit Insurance and Financial Development," World
Bank, mimeo.
DeLong, B. (1991). "Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Value? An Economist's Perspective on Financial
Capitalism," in P. Temin, Editor, Inside the Business Enterprise: Historical Perspectives on
the Use of Information, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
43Demirguic-Kunt,  A. and E. Detragiache (2000). Does Deposit Insurance Increase Banking System
Stability? An Empirical Investigation," The World Bank, mimeo.
Demirgui9-Kunt,  A. and H. Huizinga (2000). "Market Discipline and Financial Safety Net Design,"
The World Bank, mimeo (earlier draft, Policy Research Paper No. 2183, 1999).
Demirgiuq-Kunt,  A., R. Levine and H.G. Min (1999). "Opening to Foreign Banks: Issues of Stability,
Efficiency, and Growth," The Implications of Globalization of World Financial Marke,fs  Korea,
Bank of Korea.
Demirgiiu-Kunt,  A., and V. Maksimovic (1998). "Law, Finance, and Firmn  Growth," Journal of Finance
53, 2107-2137.
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994). The Prudential Regulation of Banks, Cambridge: MIT Pvress.
Djankov, S., R. La Porta, F. Lopez-deSilanes, A. Shleifer (2001). "The Regulation of Entry," Quarterly
Journal of Economics,forthcoming.
Djankov, S., C. McLiesh, T. Nenova, and A. Shleifer (2001). "Who Owns the Media?" Worlc Bank
mimeo.
Dollar, D., and A. Kraay (2000). "Growth Is Good for the Poor." Mimeo, The World Bank.
Easterly, William and Ross Levine, "Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions."
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112, 1203-1250.
Edwards, F.R. 1979. "Banks and Securities Activities: Legal and Economic Perspective on the Glass-
Steagall Act," in L. Goldberg and L.J. White, Editors, The Deregulation of Banking Securities
Activities, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 273-94.
Eisenbeis, R. and L.D. Wall (1984). "Risk Considerations in Deregulating Bank Activities," Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta Economic Review 69, Special Issue, May, 6-19.
Flannery, M. (1989). "Capital Regulation and Insured Banks' Choices of Individual Loan Default
Rates," Journal of Monetary Economics 24, 235-258.
Furlong, F. T., and M. C. Keeley (1989). "Capital Regulation and Bank Risk-Taking: A Note,'  Journal
of Banking and Finance 13, 883-891.
Gallup, J.L., J. D. Sachs, and A. D. Mellinger. "Geography and Economic Development," National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 6849, December 1998.
Genotte, G. and D. Pyle (1991). "Capital Controls and Bank Risk," Journal of Banking and Finance
15(5), 805-924.
Gerschenkron, A. (1962). Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays.
Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Gorton, G., and A. Winton (1999). "Liquidity Provision, the Cost of Bank Capital, and the
Macroeconomy," Institute for Financial Studies, Carlson School of Management, University of
44Minnesota.
Greenspan, A. (1998). "The Role of Capital in Optimal Banking Supervision and Regulation," in
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Financial Services at the Crossroads:  Capital Regulation
in the Twenty-First Century, Proceedings of a Conference," FRBNY Economic Policy Review
4:3, October.
Hoggarth, G., R. Reis, and V. Saporta (2001). "Costs of Banking System Instability: Some Empirical
Evidence," Bank of England.
Jayaratne, J., and P. E. Strahan (1996). "The Finance-Growth  Nexus: Evidence from Bank Branch
Deregulation," Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 639-670.
John, K.; T.A. John and A. Saunders (1994). "Universal Banking and Firm Risk Taking," Journal of
Banking and Finance 18, 307-23.
Kahane, Y. (1977). "Capital Adequacy and the Regulation of Financial Intermediaries," Journal of
Banking and Finance 1, 207-218.
Kamarck, Andrew. 1976. The Tropics and Economic Development: A Provocative Inquiry into the
Poverty of Nations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Kane, E.J. (2000). "Designing Financial Safety Nets to Fit Country Circumstances," The World Bank,
mimeo.
Kaufman, G. G. (1991). "Capital in Banking: Past, Present and Future," Journal of Financial Services
Research 5, 385-402.
Keeley, M. C. (1990). "Deposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking," American Economic
Review 80:5, 1183-1200.
Keeley,  M.C., and F. T. Furlong (1990). "A Reexamination of Mean-Variance Analysis of Bank
Capital Regulations." Journal of Banking and Finance 14, 69-84.
Kahn, C. and J.A.C. Santos (2001). "Allocating Bank Regulatory Powers: Lender of Last Resort,
Deposit Insurance and Supervision," Federal Reserve Bank of New York mimeo.
King, R. G., and R. Levine (1993a). "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right," Quarterly
Journal of Economics 108, 717-38.
King, R. G., and R. Levine (1  993b). "Finance, Entrepreneurship, and Growth: Theory and Evidence,"
Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 513-42.
Kim, D. and A. M. Santomero (1988). "Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation." Journal of Finance
35, 1219-1233.
Koehn, M. and A. M. Santomero (1980). "Regulation of Bank Capital and Portfolio Risk." Journal of
Finance 35, 1235-1250.
Kornai, J. (1979). "Resource-constrained  vs. Demand-constrained Systems," Econometrica  49, 801-
4519.
Kroszner, R. S., and R. G. Rajan. (1994) "Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study of the US
Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933," American Economic Review 84, 810-832.
Kwan, S. H., and E. S. Laderman (1999) "On the Portfolio Effects of Financial Convergence -A
Review of the Literature," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic Review 2, 18-31.
Lam, C. H. and A. H. Chen (1985). "Joint Effects of Interest Rate Deregulation and Capital
Requirements on Optimal Bank Portfolio Adjustments," Journal of Finance 45(2), 563-575.
Lamoreaux, N. (1994). Insider Lending: Banks, Personal Connections, and Economic Development in
Industrial New England, Cambridge University Press.
Landes, D. The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, 1998, New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; and Shleifer, A. "Government Ownership of Commercial Banks",
Journal of Finance,forthcoming, 2001.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes, F.; Shleifer, A.; and Vishny, R. W. "The Quality of Government,"
Joural  of Law. Economics, and Organization, 1999, 15(1), pp. 222-279.
La Porta, R.; Lopez-de-Silanes,  F.; Shleifer, A.; and Vishny, R. W. "Law and Finance," Journal of
Political Economy, 1998, 106(6), pp. 1113-1155
Levine, R. (1999). "Napoleon, Bourses, and Growth: With A Focus on Latin America," in Omar Azfar
and Charles Cadwell, Editors, Market Augmenting Government Washington, D.C.: IRIS,
forthcoming.
Levine, R.; N. Loayza, and T. Beck (2000). "Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and
Causes," Journal of Monetary Economics.
Levine, R., and S. Zervos (1998). "Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth," American
Economic Review 88, 537-558.
Levine, R. (1997). "Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda," Journal of
Economic Literature 35, 688-726.
Lewis, A. (1950). The Principles of Economic Planning. London: G. Allen & Unwin.
Mauro, P. (1995) "Corruption and Growth," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, pp. 681-711.
Mullins, M. H., and D. H. Pyle (1994). "Liquidation Costs and Risk-Based Bank Capital," Journal of
Banking and Finance 18, 113-138.
Myrdal, G. (1968). Asian Drama, New York: Pantheon.
Pagano, M. (1993), "Flotation of companies on the stock market: a coordination failure model.
46European Economic Review (Netherlands), 37:1101-25 June 1993.
Pages, H. and J.A.C. Santos (2001). "Optimal Supervisory  Policies and Depositor-Preference  Laws,"
Federal Reserve Bank of New York mimeo.
Peterson, M. and R. Rajan (1994). "Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence from Small Business
Data," Journal of Finance 49, 3-37.
Pigou, Arthur C. (1938). The Economics of Welfare,  4 th Edition. London: MacMillan & Co.
Puri, M. (1996). "Commercial Banks in Investment Banking: Conflict of Interest or Certification
Role?" Journal of Financial Economics 40, 373-401.
Putnam, R. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modem Italy, 1993, Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press.
Rajan, R. G., and L. Zingales (1998). "Financial Dependence and Growth," American Economic
Review 88, 559-586.
,(2001).  ""The Great Reversals: the Politics of Financial Development in the
20th Century," mimeo, The University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.
Ramirez, C. (1995). "Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate Investment, Cash-Flow, and
Financial Structure at the Turn of the Century," Journal of Finance 50, 661-78.
Ramirez, C. (1999). "Did Bank Security Affiliates Add Value? Evidence from the Commercial
Banking Industry During the 1920s," George Mason University mimeo, October.
Rochet, J. (1992). "Capital Requirements and the Behavior of Commercial Banks," European
Economic Review 36, 1137-1178.
Santos, J.A.C. (2001). "Bank Capital Regulation in Contemporary Banking Theory: A Review of the
Literature," Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 10(2), 41-84.
Saunders. A. (1985) "Conflicts of Interest: An Economc View", in I. Walter (Ed.), Deregulating  Wall
Street: Commercial Bank Penetration of the Corporate Securities Market, (New York: John
Wiley & Sons), 207-30.
Shaffer, S. (1993). "Test of Competition in Canadian Banking," Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking 25, February, 49-61.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1993). "Corruption," Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 599-617.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1994). "Politicians and Firms," Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 995-
1025.
Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1998). The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Stevens, E. (2000). "Evolution in Banking Supervision," Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve
47Bank of Cleveland.
Thakor, A.V. and P. F. Wilson (1995). "Capital Requirements, Loan Renegotiations and the
Borrower's Choice of Financing Source," Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 693-71  1.
Thakor, A.V. (1996). "The Design of Financial Systems: An Overview," Journal of Banking and
Finance 20, 917-948.
Vennet, R.V. (1999).  "Costs and Profit Dynamics in Financial Conglomerates and Universal Banks
in Europe," mimeo, May, University of Gent.
Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 1958, New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons.
White, E. (1986). "Before the Glass-Steagall Act: An Analysis of the Investment Banking Activities of
Commercial Banks," Explorations in Economic History 23, 33-55.
World Bank (2000). Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2000, The World
Bank.
Wurgler, J. (2000). "Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital," Journal of Financial Economics,
58(1-2), 187-214.
48Table I
Information  on Bank Regulatory,  Supervisory and Deposit Insurance  Variables
Variable  Definition  Source  and Quantification  World  Bank Guide Questions
1.  BoankA  cliviev Regulatory  Variables
OCC and  WBG 4  i (higher  volues,  more  restrictive)
Unrestricted  =  I = full range of activities  can be
The extent  to which banks  nay engage  In uiderwriting,  conducted  directly  n  the bank,  l'rniitted  - 2  fiulln  rage  IeWhatis  theileve  ofhegulatory  restrictiveness  for bank participation  in
(a) Securities  Activities  brokering  and dealittg  in securities,  and all aspects  of  of  activities  can be cotiducted,  but some or  all must  be  derwfitivibes  deality  and  to  age  ofthe  busin  f  stcunl
the mutmal ftnd  industry  conducted  itt  subsidiarics;  Restricted  - 3 = less  thati full  utiderwriting.  broker"it,  dealing,  and  all aspects  of the mutl  fond  industry
range  of activities  can be conducted  in the bank or
subsidiaries,  and Prohibited  = 4 - the activity  cannot  be
conducted  in either  the bank or  subsidiaries.
OCC and WBG  4.2 (higher  values, more  restrictive)
Unuestricted  =  I  - full  range ofactivities  can be  4 2 What  is the level  ofregulatory  restrictiseness  for banik participation  in
The extent to which  baiiks may engage  it  insurance  conducted  directly  in the batnk, Peitted  b2  - full range  insurance  activities  (the  ability of  banks  to engage  in insurance  underwriting  and
(hi Insurance  Activities  udritnadselg.of  activities  can be conducted,  hut  some or all must  be  ln?
underwvriting and selling.  conducted  ill  subsidiaries,  Restricted  - 3  c less  than fill  selling)?
range of activities  can be conducted  in the bank or
subsidiaries;  and  Prohibited  = 4  - the activity  cannot  be
conducted  in either  the bank or subsidiaries.
OCC and WBG  4 3 (higher  values,  more restrictive)
Unrestricted  = I =  full range  of activities  can be  4.3 What  is the level  ofregulatory  restrictiveness  for  hank paricipationitonteal
(c) Real  Estate  Activities  The extent to which  baks  ntay engage  in real  estate  o  activite  ca  becondted,  butse  - m  b  estate  activities  (the ability  of  atks  to engage  it real  estate  investment,
investment,  development  and management.  condcvted  in  subsidiaries.  Restcted  =3  =less  than full  development,  and management)?
range of activities  can be conducted  in thie bank ot
subsidiaries;  and Prohibited  - 4 = the activity  canniot be
conducted  in either the bank  or subsidiaries.
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2.  Mixing  Banking/  Commerce  Regulatory  Variables
OCC and WBG  4.4 (higher  values, more restrictive)
Unrestricted= I = a bank may  own 100  percent ofthe
equity  in any  nonfinancial  firmn;  Permnitted  = 2 =a bank equiy i an nofinacia  fin  Pnmited  2  a  ank  4.4  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness  for bank ownership  of
(a) Bank  Owning Nonfinancial  Firmns  The  extent to which  banks may own and control  may  own 100  percent  ofthe equity ofa nonfinancial  firm, nonfinancial  firms?
nonfinancial  firms,  but ownership  is limited  based  on  a bank's  equity  capital;
Restricted = 3 = a bank can only acquire less than 100
percent of the equity in a nonfinancial  firm; and
Prohibited  =  4 =  a bank may not acquire any equity
investment  in a nonfinancial  finm.
OCC and WBG  2.3 (higher  values, more restrictive)
Unrestricted  = I = a nonfinancial  finm  may own 100  2.3  What is the level of regulatory restrictiveness  of ownership  by nonfinancial
(b) Nonfinancial  Firms  Owning Banks  The extent to which  nonfinancial  firms may  own and  percent of the equity in  a bank; Permitted  - 2  =  firms of banks?
control  banks,  unrestricted  with prior authorization  or approval;
Restricted  =3 = limits are  placed  on  ownership,  such  as  a
maximum  percentage  of a  bank's  capital  or shares; and
Prohibited  = 4 = no equity investment  in a bank.
3.  Competition  Regulatory  Variables
Whether  foreign banks may own domestic  banks and  (CC
(a) Limitations  on Foreign  Bank  Entry/Ownership  whether  foreign banks may enter  a country  s banking  Yes = 1; No  0
industry.
1.8  Which  of the following are legally required to be submitted before issuance  of
the banking license?
1.  8.1 Draft by-laws?  Yes / No
WBG 1.8.1  -1.8.8  1.8.2  Intended organization  chart? Yes / No
(b) Entry  into Banking  Requirements  Whether  various typcs  of legal submissions  are  1.8.3  Financial  projections for first three  years? Yes! No
required  to obtain a banking license.  Yes =I;  No = 0  1.8.4  Financial  information  on main potential shareholders?  Yes / No
Higher values  indicating  greater stringency.  1.8.5  Background/experience  of future  directors? Yes / No
1.8.6  Background/experience  of future managers?  Yes / No
1.8.7 Sources  of funds to be disbursed  in the capitalization  of new  banks? Yes / No
1.8,8  Market differentiation  intended  for the new  bank? Yes / No
1.9  In the past five years, how many applications  for commercial  banking licenses
have been received  from domestic entities?
(c) Fraction  of Entry Applications  Denied  The degree  to which applications  to enter  banking  W  i  W  1 9 t + t  l  I  1,1  4  I)  (pure  umber)  the past fe  yers  ho  applications  ha  for comercial  ba  ing lic nses
have been received  from foreign entities?
1.  10.1  How many of those applications  have been denied?
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T_he  degree  to which  foreign applications  to  nter  1.9 In  the past five  years, how many applications  for commercial  banking licenses
(I)  Domestic  Denials  The degree  to which  foreign applications  to enter  WBG 1.9.1  / 1.9 (pure number)  have been  received from  domestic entities?
banking are denied.  1.9.1  How many of those applications  have been denied?
'Me degree  to  which  domestic applications  to enter  1.10 In the past five years, how many applications  for commercial banking licenses
(2) Foreign  Denials  Thebanking  are denied.  WBG 1.10.  1 / 1.  10 (pure number)  have been  received from foreign entities?
1.10.1  How many of those applications  have been denied?
4.  Ctapital  Regulutory Variables
3.1.1 Is the minimum capital-asset ratio  requirement  risk weighted  in line with the
WBG 3.1.1 + 3.3 + 3.9.1  + 3.9.2 + 3.9.3 + (I  if 3.6 <  Basel guidelines?  Yes / No
Whether the capital  requirement  reflects certain  risk  0  .1.1  3.3 Does the minimum  ratio vary as a fisnction  of market risk? Yes / No
elements  and deducts certain  market value  losses from  . 3.9.1 Are market value  of loan losses  not realized in accounting  books deducted? (a) Overall  Capital Stningency  capital  before minimum  capital  adequacy is  Yes =  0s  No
determined,  Yesg= ,u  nod0  3.9.2 Are unrealized  losses  in securities portfolios deducted? Yes  / No
Higher values  indicating  greater stringency.  3.9.3 Are unrealized foreign  exchange losses deducted?  Yes / No
3.6 What fraction  of revaluation gains is allowed as part of capital?
1.5  Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified  by the
Whether certain funds may be used  to initially  WBG 1.5:  Yes = 1,  No = 0: WBG 1.6&1.7:  Yes=0,  regulatory/supervisory  authorities?  Yes  / No
(b) Initial  Capital Stringency  capitalize a  bank  and whether  they are officially  No=l . 1.6  Can the initial disbursement  or subsequent injections  of capital  be done with
verified.  Higher values  indicating  greater stringency.  assets other than cash or govemment securities? Yes  / No
1.7  Can initial disbursement  of capital be done with borrowed funds?  Yes / No
(c) Capital  Regulatory  Index  T'he  swu of (a) and (b).  (a) + (b)
Higher values  indicate  greater stringency.
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5.  Official  Supervisory Action  Variables
5.5  Does  the upervisorty  agency  have  the  right to  meet  with extenal auditors  to
discuss  their  report  without  the  approval  of the  bank?  Yes  / No
5.6 Are  auditors  required  by law  to communicate  directly  to  the  supervisory  agenc
any  presumed  involvement  of bank  directors  or senior  managers  in elicit activities,
fraud,  or insider  abuse?  Yes  / No
5.7  Can  supervisors  take  legal  action  against  external  auditors  for negligence?  Yes
/ No
6.1  Can  the  supervisory  authority  force  a bank  to change  its internal  organizational
structure? Yes  / No
WBG  5.5  + 5.6  + 5.7  4 6.1  + 10.4  + 111,2  + 11.3.1  +  10.4  Areoff-balanceshetitems  disclosedtosupervisors?  Yes/ No
11..2  11..3  116 +11.  +  1.91 +11.  2  119.3  1  1.2 Can  the  supervisory  agency  order  the  bank's  directors  or management  to
Whether  the  supervisory  authorities  have  the  authority 11.3.2+11.3.3+11.6+11.7+  11.9.1  + 11.9.2+11.9.3  constitute  provisions  to cover  actual  or potential  losses?  Yes  / No
(a)  Official Supervisory  Power  to take  specific  actions  to prevent  and  correct  Yes  = I; No = 0  11.3  Can  the  supervisory  agency  suspend  the  directorsNdecision  to  distribute:
Sum  of these  assigned  values,  with higher  values  11.3.2  Bonuses?  Yes  / No
indicating  greater  power.  11.3.3  Management  fees?  Ycs  / No
11.6  Can  the  supervisory  agency  legally  declare-such  that  this  declaration
supersedes  the  rights  of bank  shareholders-that  a bank  is insolvent?  Yes  / No
11.7  Does  the  Banking  Law  give  authority  to the  supervisory  agency  to
intervene  that  is, suspend  some  or all ownership  rights-a  problem  bank?  Yes  / No
11.9  Regarding  bank  restructuring  and  reorganization,  can  the  supervisory  agency
or any  other  government  agency  do the  following: ? Yes  / No
11.9.1  Supersede  shareholder  rights?  Yes  / No
11.9.2  Remove  and  replace  management?  Yes  / No
11.9.3  Remove  and  replace  directors?  Yes!/  No
11.8  Does  the  Law  establish  pre-determined  levels  of solvency  deterioration  which
forces  automatic  actions  (like intervention)?  Yes  / No
WBG  1.  (I  .I+  1.2  +11..1  1  L.2  113.3  I . Are there  any  mechanisms  of cease  and  desist-type  orders,  whose  infraction
WBG  11.8  ' (II.I  + 11.2  +  11.3.1  +  11.3.2  + 11,3,3  +  leads  to the  automatic  imposition  ofivil  and  penal  sanctionsron  the  hatk's
6.1  )  directors  and  managers?  Yes  / No
Whether  the  law  establishes  predetermined  levels  of  y  = i  No _ 0  11.2  Can  the  supervisory  agency  order  the  bank's  directors  or management  to
(I) Prompt  Corrective  Power  bank  solvency  deterioration  that  force  automatic  Principal  component  of the  assigned  values  for the  items  constitute  provisions  to cover  actual  or potential  losses?  Yes  / No
actions,  such  as intervention.  in parenthesis  multiplied  by I if1there  is a legally  pre-  1i.3 Can  the  supervisory  agency  suspend  the  directors'  decision  to distribute:
in aretheis  ultplid  b  Iif  her isa lgaly  pe-  11.3.1  Dividends?  Yes/  No
determined  level  of solvency  deterioration  forcing  11.  3.2 Bonuses?  Yes  / No
automatic  actions  and  by 0 if not.  11.3.3  Management  fees?  Yes  / No
6.1  Can  the  supernisory  authority  fo-  a  b-1,k  iu  a  iso  intemnai  organizational
structure?  Yes  / No
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WBG 1 1.9.1I  + 11.9.2  + 11.9.3  11.9 Regarding  bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency
WBG  11.9.1  +  11.9.2+ 11.9.3  or any other government agency do the following:
Whether the supervisory authorities have the power to  or any othersede  ager  thes? ollswiNo
(2) Restucturing  Power  restructure and reorganize a troubled bank.  Yes =  I; No = 0  11.9.2 Remove and replace  management? Yes / No
Higher values indicate greater restructuring power  11.9.3 Remove and replace dircmtors?  Yes / No
WBG  11.6  + 11.7  11.6  Can the supervisory agency legally declare-such that this declaration
(3) Declaring  Insolvency  Power  Whether the supervisory authorities have the power to  supersedes  the rights of bank shareholders-that  a bank is insolvent? Yes / No
(3)  Declaring Insolvency  Power  declare  a deeply troubled bank insolvent.  Yes = I; No = 0  11.7  Does the Banking Law give  authority to the supervisory agency to intervene-
Higher values indicating greater power.  that is, suspend  some or all  ownership rights-a problem bank? Yes / No
WBG  11.9.4  + (12.10 -1)  * (-I)  + (I1.8  -I)  a (-I)  +  11.9.4  Can the supervisory agency or any other government agency forbear certain
(12  11..)  +  (-  - 1  prudential regulations? Yes / No
Whether the supervisory authorities may engage  in  11.8 Does the Law establish pre-detertnined levels of solvency deterioration which
(b) Supervisory Forbearance Discretion  forbearance  when confronted with violations  of laws  forces automatic actions (like intervention)?  Yes / No
and regulations or other imprudent behavior.  Sum ofthese assignN  d values such that higher values  12.10 If an infraction  of any prudential regulation is found by a supervisor, must it
Sumicof  gethese  assceigned  vausschthgeaus  be reported? Yes / No
indicate greater discretion.  12.11 Are there mandatory actions in these cases?  Yes / No
WBG 9.2.1 - 9.2.3 (days)
9.2 Classification of loans in arrears based on their quality:  after how many days is
The classification of loans in arrears  as sub-standard,  If there is a loan classification  system,  the actual  a loan in arrears classified as:
(c) Loan Classification  Stringency  doubtful  and Iota.  minimum number of days  beyond which a loan in arrears  9.2 1 Sub-standard  ?
must be classified as sub-standard,  then  doubtful,  and  9.2.2 Doubtful?
finally  loss are  summed. Higher values indicate less  9.2 3 Loss?
stringency.
WBG 9.3.1 -9.3.3 (percent)
'Me su  ofhe  miimumrequied  povisining  9.3 What are the minimum required provision  as loans become:
(d) Provisioning Stringency  standar,  doubtmul  ad  oss  T  percentages  when a loan is successively  classified a  9.3.1 Dubtful?
standard,  doubtful  and loss.  substandard,  doubtful, andltots.  Ifsarange is provided,  932Dobfl
the minimum  percentage  is used. Higher values indicate
greater stringency.
Whether there are  explicit,  verifiable,  quantifiable  WBG 7 1 + (7 2 - 1)  (-)  7.1  Are there explicit,  verifiable,  and quantifiable guidelines  regarding asset
(e) Diversification  Index  guidelines for  asset  diversification,  and banks are  Yes  I:1;  No = 0  diversification?  Yes / No
allowed to make loans abroad.  Sum of these  assigned  values, with higher values  7.2 Ae  banks prohibited  from making loas  abroad? Yes / No
indicating more diversification.
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6.  Official Supervisory  Resource  Variables
(a) Supervisor  Tenure  The average  tenure of  a professional bank supervisor.  WBG 12.9.1 (years)  number of years current supervi  h  b  srs  (ie  what is the average
The degree  to which the supervisory authority  is  WBG  12.2, 12.2.1  and  t22.2  12.2  To wlom  are the supervisory bodies responsible or accountable? (b)~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~~~~  ~h  degreeenc  to whprvioh  theont  witrihinatortyi
(b) Independence  of Supervisory Authority  within  independent  within  the government from political  I  l  i  e2.1  2How  is the head of the supervisory agency (and other directors)  appointed?
Govemnment
influence.  I = low  independence;  2 = medium independence;  3  12.2.2How  is the head of the supcrvisory agency (and other directors)  removed?
high independence
(c) Independence  of Supervisory Authority  from  the  The degree  to which the supervisory authority is  WBG 12.14
Banking Industry  protected by the legal system from  the banking  12.14 Are supervisors legally liable  for their actions?
industry.  Yes=O; No=l
The degree  to which the supervisory authority is  WBG (b) X  (c)
(d) Independence  of  Supervisory Authority  Overall  independent  from  the government and legally  Higher values signiify greater independenice
protected from the banking industry.
7.  Prirate Mtonitoring  Variables
(a) Certified Audit Required  Whether there  is a compulsory extemal audit by a  WBG 5.1  0  5.3 (Yes  =;  No  0)  5.1 Is an  external audit  a compulsory obligation  for banks? Yes / No
(a)  Certified  Audit  Required  licensed or certified auditor.  5.3 Are auditors licensed or certified? Yes / No
(b) Percent  of  10  Biggest Banks Rated by Intemational  The percentage  of the top ten banks that are rated by  WBG 10.7.1  (percent)  10.7.1 What percent of  the top ten banks are rated by interniational credit rating
Rating Agencies  intemational credit rating agencies.  . agencies  (e.g., Moody's, Standard and Poor)?
Whether there  is an explicit  deposit insurance scheme  WBG I if  g.  = 0 atid 8.4 = 0;  0 otherwise  8.1 Is there  an explicit  deposit insurance protection system? Yes / No
(c) No Explicit  Deposit Insurance Scheme  and, if not, whether depositors were fully  compensated Yes =1  No =0  8.4 Were depositors wholly  compensated  (to the extent of legal protection) the last
the last time a bank failed.  Higher values indicate more private supervision  time a bank failed? Yes / No
Whether the income statement includes accrued or  WBG (10.1. I - 1)*(-  I)  + 10.3 + 10.6  while the loan is still  non-performing?
unpaid interest or principal on nonperformming  loans  Yes=  1, No=Owhltelonisilnnprfnng
(d) Bank Accounting  and whether banks are required to produce  Sum of assigned  values, with  higher values indicating  03  Are financial  instotubfionsrequired  sidPiaries?  .6 Ar  blak  direc ors legalIy
_  consolidated  financial  statements,  more informative  bank accounts,  liable if  information  disclosed is erroneous or misleading?
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Whether (a) occurs, (b) equals 100%, (c) occurs, (d)  WBG2 (a) + [I  if(b)  equals 100%  0 otherwise] + (c) t  10 4.1 Are off-balance sheet  items disclosed to the public? Yes/No
occurs, off-balance sheet items are disclosed to the  (d) + 10 4 1 + 10.5  + 3 5  10.5  Must  banks disclose their risk management procedures to the public? Yes
(e) Private Monitoring  Index  public, banks must disclose risk management  No
procedures to the piiblic,  and subordinated  debt is  Yes = I  No = 0  35  Is subordinated debt allowable  (required)  as part of capital
9
Yes / No
allowable  (required) as a part of regulatory capital.  Higher values indicating more pnvate supervision.
8.  Deposit  Insurance  Scheme  Variubles
Whether the deposit insurance authority has  the  WBG 8 1 5 + 8.6 + 8.7  8.1.5  Docs the deposit insurance authority  make the decision to intervene a bank?
Whetheoritytomake  the de  cisiosit  to  insurae  a  rity  has  b  ,  Yes i No
authority  to make the decisiott to intervene in  a bank,  86  6 Can the deposit insurance agency/fund take legal action  against bank directors
(a) Deposit Insurer Power  take lega! action against bank directors or ofi cials, and Yes = I; No  - 0  or other bank officials7  Yes /  No
or officers  Sun of  assigned  values, with higher s alues indicating  8.7  Has the deposit insurance agenicy/fund ever taken legal action against bank
more power  directors or other bank officials?  Ycs / No
(b) Deposit Insurance Funds-to-Total Bank Assets  The size ofthe deposit insurance fund relative to total  WBG 8 1 2 (pure number)  8.1 2 What is the ratio of accumulated funds to total bank assets?
bank assets
Demiirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2000)
(c) Nioral Hazard Index  The degree  to which moral hazard exists.
_________________________________________________  Higher values indicate tmore  moral hazard.
9. .Mtarket  Structure  Indicators
(a) Bank Concetitration  The degree  of concentration of deposits in the 5 largest WHBG  26  (pure number)  2 6 Of deposit-taking institutions  in your country  what fraction of  deposits is held
banks.  b  h  ie()lretbns
(b) Foreign-Owned Banks  'iThe  extent to which the banking systenm's  assets  are  WBG 3.8 (percent)  3.8 What fraction of the banking system's assets is in banks that arc 50% or more
_  b) Foreign-Owned Banks  foreign owned.  foreign  owned_
The extent to which the banking system's assets  are  WBG 3.7 (percent)  3.7 What fraction of the banking system's assets  is in banks that are 50%.  or mnore
(c) Government-Ownted  Banks  owned  government owned?
Note  WBG denotes World  Bank Guide, which is available at www.worldbank,org/research/interest/itttrstweb htm.
55Table 2
Correl'orziiroirg  S~isr  rteri  Variabies
Entry intorBkg  Ety  Cspital  Restrtins  on  Private  MIH  d  OfOil  Prompt  Government
Requirements  Index  Drued(°/.)  CaIta  d  etYto  s  o  orn  ga  I  Suprvary  Corrtiv  L  Owesed  Banks  orelgfuWned  jovament Requiteyminto  BInking  DEntey  -plcton  Rgniry  BaKAtVss  Monitoring  Index  rrcie  Loans,  Banks  (%/)  Intgrity Ind..  Index  Index  Pow'er  Index  Power Index()
Entry into Banking
Requirements  Index  1.000
Entry Applmtions Denied (%)  (0.94)  1.000
Capital RegulItory  Inde  0.021  -0.465  1.000
(0.853)  (0.000)
Retriotbonson  Bank  0.035  0.364  -0.202  1.000
Aotiies tIndex  (0.757)  (0.003)  (0.072)
Privat  Monitorig Indec  -0.218  -0.434  0.185  -0.328  1.000
(0.049)  (0.000)  (0.098)  (0.003)
Moral  Hacrdlndex  -0.208  -0.190  0.286  -0.234  0.183  1.000
(0.152)  (0.247)  (0.046)  (0.110)  (0.209)
OflitialSSupervsorYPowW  0.094  0.099  -0.063  0.146  -0.091  0.010  1.000
(0.399)  (0.431)  (0.575)  (0.193)  (0.418)  (0.945)
PromptCorretivePower  0.061  0.009  -0.047  0.070  -0.002  0.106  0.500  1.000
Index  (0.589)  (0.943)  (0.684)  (0.541)  (0.983)  (0.472)  (0.000)
No Foreign Loans  0.026  0.263  -0.023  0.229  -0.210  -0.170  0.099  0.036  1.000
(0.820)  (0.034)  (0.840)  (0.040)  (0.058)  (0.243)  (0.377)  (0.752)
Govesnment  Owned Bank
(%)  -0.131  0.385  -0.150  0.332  -0.362  -0.060  -0.007  -0.063  0.271  1.000
(0.273)  (0.003)  (0.209)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.700)  (0.957)  (0.598)  (0.021)
ForeignaOwnedBeaks(%)  0.197  0.045  0.170  0.043  -0.182  -0.291  0.176  0.044  0.055  -0.225  1.000
(0.112)  (0.748)  (0.173)  (0.736)  (0.143)  (0.072)  (0.158)  (0.723)  (0.661)  (0.069)
GovermmetIntaegity  -0.088  -0.482  0.312  -0.554  0.594  0.112  -0.393  -0.155  -0.366  -0.422  -0.062  1.000
(0. 509)  (0.001)  (0.018)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.455)  (0.002)  (0.248)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.684)
Ln(GDP/Capita)  -0.069  -0.471  0.319  -0.494  0.690  0.255  -0.246  -0.103  -0.275  -0.500  -0.216  0.776
(0.575)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.081)  (0.042)  (0.406)  (0.022)  (0.000)  (0.116)  (0.000)
Notes: P-values In  Parentheses.
Principal  components  version  of  the  indexes.
56Table 3
Government  Integrity, Regulation,  and Supervision
Dependent Variable: Corrupt  (bigger  values  imply less  corruption,  i.e., greater  govemment  integrity)  Panel B:
Panel  A: Government  Integrity  Interaction  Term
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14
Entry into Banking  Requirements  0.085
(0.397)
Limitations  on Foreign Bank  Entry/Ownership  -0.260
(0.407)
Entry Applications Denied  (%)  -1.269
(0.013)
Capital  Regulatory  Index  0.303
(0.085)
Restrictions  on Bank  Activities  -0.591
(0.003)
Private  Monitoring Index  0.833
(0.001)
Moral  Hazard  Index  0.040
(0.589)
Official Supervisory  Power  -0.402  -0.509
(0.008)  (0.000)
Prompt  Corrective  Power  -0.324
(0.147)
No Foreign  Loans  -1.789
__(0.000)
Government-Owned  Banks (%/.)  -2.727
(0.003)
Supervisory  Independence  0.231
(0.122)
Multiple Supervisory  Agencies  0.002
(0.995)
Political Openness  0.618
(0.000)
Official Supervisory  Power-Political  Openness  0.281
(0.001)
-valuelforthe  F-teston  ethnic  diversity  ad  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.030)
religious  composition
Constant  6.512  6.416  6.988  6.234  5.724  5.656  6.372  5.912  6.397  6.683  6.904  5.743  6.422  5.171
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0,000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
R-square  0.384  0.362  0.586  0.417  0.502  0.525  0.378  0.453  0.403  0.549  0.562  0.405  0.379  0.637
N  56  43  44  55  55  56  47  56  55  56  50  56  56  52
Note P-values  i,  parentheses  under  the estimated  coefficients,  using  heteroskedasticity-cossistent  standard  errors  from an  OLS regrCssion
Each  column represents  a separate  regression  of Government  Integrity on Ethnic Di,ersitv, Catholic.  Muslim.,  Other  religions,  and the indicated  varrable(s)  listed in the first column
INull  hypothesis  is that  the Ethnic  Diversity,  Catholic, Muslim. and  Other Denomination  variables  enter  with zero  coefficients
The following indices  are  principal component  versions Entry into Banking  Requirements.  Capital  Regulatory  Index,  Restrictions  on Bank  Activities. Pris  ate Monitoring Index,
Official Supersisory  Power,  Prompt  Conrective  Power  57Table 4
Government  Integrity,  Regulation,  and Supervision:  Instrumental  Variables
Dependent Variable: Corrupt  (higger valies imply less corruption, i.e., greater government  integrity)
l  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13
Entry  into  Banking  Requirements  3.289
(0.589)
Limitations  on Foreign  Bank  Entry/Ownership  -2.148
(0.066)
En"y  Applications  Denied  (%/.)  -10.288
(0.002)
Capital  Regulatory  Index  1.776
(0.005)
Restrictions  on Bank  Activities  -2.540
.. __________________________  (0.002)
Private  Monitoring  Index  1.960
(0.000)
Moral  Hazard  Index  0.453
(0.060)
Official  Supervisory  Power  -1.644
(0.005)
Prompt  Corrective  Power  0.764
(0.585)
No Foreign  Loans  -3.491
(0.002)
Government-Owned  Banks (%)  -15.638
(0.068)
Supervisory  Independence  1.239
(0.001)
Multiple  Supervisory  Agencies  2.6 17
(0.224)
Constant  12.621  5.974  6.386  5.290  3.916  4.718  5.975  3.095  6.838  6.180  7.741  4.385  6.467
(0.031)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
OIR-Test'  3.86  4.31  5.72  1.76  1.32  4.02  6.95  6.61  14.80**  11.48**  2.30  4.76  9.88**
N  56  43  44  55  55  56  47  56  55  56  50  56  56
Note:  P-values  in parentheses  under  the estimated  coefficients,  using a GMM  instrumental  variables  regression.
Each  column  represents  a separate  regression  of Government  Integrity  on Ethnic Diversity,  Catholic,  Muslim,  Other religions,  and the indicated  variable  listed in the first  column.
Instruments:  Legal  origin  dummy  variables  (Common  Law.  French Civil  law  German  Civil I ao) and latitudinal  distance  from the equator,  Ethnic  Diversity,
and rriigious  dummy  variables  (Catholic,  Muslim,  and Other  religions)
'(ver  )dentifying  Restriction  Test:  Tests  null hypothsis  that  the instruments  are uncorrelated  with the residual.
5%  Critical  Values  for OIR Test (3 d.f.): 7.82.
The  following  indices  are principal  component  versions:  Entry into  Banking  Requirements,  Capital  Regulatory  Index,  Restrictions  on Bank  Activities,  Private  Monitoring  Index,
Official  Supervisory  Power, Prompt  Corrective  Power.  58Table 5
Bank Development, Regulation, and Supervision
Dependent  Variable: Bank Development  (Bank  Credit  to the Private  Sector as Share  of GDP)  P.nel  BE
Panel  A: Bank evdeopnment  Interartimn  Term
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  1  1  12  13  14
Entry  mti Banking  Requirements  -0.005
(0.833)
Limitations  on  Forign  Book  Enty/Ownership  -0.025
(0.689)
Entry  Applications  Denied  (0)  -0.075
(0.635)
Capital  Reguloaory  IndWx  0.044
(0.226)
Rstrictions  on Book  Activities  -0.143
(0.000)
Pdvate  Monitoring  IndWx  0.133
(0.000)
Morau  Ha-ard Index  -0.014
(0.420)
Official  Supervisory  Power  -0.061  -0.092
(0.073)  (0.013)
Prompt  Corrective  Power  -0.096
(0.048)
No  Foreign  Loans  -0.250
(0.001)
Goveotmmnt-en-  d Bnks ()-0.425
(0.001)
Supervisory  ladependence  0.070
(0.033)
Multipl Supervisory  Agencics  -0.007
(0.946)
Political  Openness  0.127
(0.000)
Official  Supervisory  PowerPolitical  Opennes  0.059
(0.003)
P-valun  fnr the F-test  on the lega ofin  dum  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
variables,
Constant  0.414  0.420  0.424  0.417  0.309  0.312  0.434  0.316  0.380  0.420  0.451  0.304  0.420  0.218
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.016)
R-squarc  0.403  0.341  0.512  0.416  0.533  0.504  0.281  0.427  0.440  0.451  0.488  0.430  0.395  0.495
N  _  77  59  61  76  76  77  49  77  75  77  69  76  76  59
Note P-values  in parentheset  under  the  estimatd  coefficients,  asing  hetemskedasticity-consisteot  standard  errors  from  an  OLS  regression.
Each  column  represents  a separat  regression  of Book  Devclopment  on  Common  Law.  Fincnh  Civil La., German  Civil Law,  Socialist  La., and  the  indicated  variabic(s)  listtd in  dhe  firt  column.
'Nail hvporhests  is that  the real  org1  nm  dummv  s  ntibles  (Common  Lw. Frcnch  C-vi Law.  German  Civil Lao,  ad Sonrohist  Law)  enter  with -cre  coefficients
The  following  indites  ma  principal  component  versions  Entry  into  Booking  Rcqatrements,  Capital  Rgulatory  Index,  Restnictions  on Bok Activities,  Pivate  Monitong Index,
Official  Supervisory  Power,  Prompt  Corrective  Power
For  regressions  7 and  14,  there  ma  no  socialist  Icgal  ongin  contnies  with  dwatso  dhe  Socialist  La,, dummy  -ai.abie  is  xcluded  59Table 6
Bank Development,  Regulation,  and Supervision:  Instrumental  Variables
I)ependent Varishlfe:  Bank Development (Bank Credit to the Private Sector as Share of GDP)
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  I 1  12  13
Entry into Banking  Requirements  -0.536
(0.390)
Limitations  on Foreign  Bank  Enitry/Ownership  -0.388
(0.092)
Enitry  Applications  Denied  (%)  -0.785
____________________________  (0.004)
Capital  Regulatory  Index  0.340
(0.024)
Restrictions  on Bank  Activities  -0.145
(0.010)
Private  Monitofing  Index  0.252
(0.001)
Moral Hazard  Index  0.109
(0.387)
Official  Supervisory  Power  -0.167
(0.148)
Prompt Corrective  Power  -2.419
(0.518)
No Foreign  Loans  -0.624
(0.080)
Govertmtent-Owned  Banks  (%)  -2.075
(0.044)
Supervisory  Independence  0.162
(0.080)
Multiple  Supervisory  Agencies  2.498
(0.295)
Constant  -0.210  0.290  0.460  0.394  0.308  0.216  0.296  0.137  -0.598  0.421  0.575  0.146  0.420
(0.835)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.139)  (0.494)  (0.742)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.421)  (0.000)
OIR-Test'  2.30  2.07  1.89  1.14  4.76  1.69  4.41  5.15  0.34  4.85  2.82  6.76  0.30
N  77  59  61  76  76  77  49  77  75  77  69  76  76
Note: P-valies in parentheses  under  the estimated  coefficients,  using  a GMM instrumental  variables  regression.
Each colsnno  represents  a separate  regression  of Bank  Development  on  Common  Law, French  Civil Law,  German  Civil  Law,  Socialist  Law,  and  the variable  listcd  in the first column.
Instruments:  Regious  composition  variables  (Catholic,  Muslim,  and Other Denomination  variables),  Legal  origin  dumnty  variables  (Common  Law, French  Civil  Law,
Genman  Civil  Law, and  Socialist  Law), and latitudinal  distance  from the equator.
Qvcr Identifying Rcstictioi  r.,:  Test., iiull.0p1ithti...l  ili.  ;thaut,v,  ---  !i,dl  ilh i.  -l
5% Critical  Values  for OIR  Test (3 d.f.): 7.S2.
For regressions  2 and 7, there  are no  socialist  legal origin  countries  with data  so the  Socialist  Law dummy  variable  is excluded.
The following  indices  are principal  component  versions:  Entry into  Banking  Requirements,  Capital  Regulatory  Index.  Restrictions  on Bank  Activities,  Private  Monitoring  Index,
Official  Supervisory  Power,  Prompt  Corective Power  60Table 7
Bank Development and Performance  Regressions
Capital  Private  Official  Entry into  Goverment-  Restrictions on
Dependent Variable  Constant'  Regulatory  Monitoring  Supervisory  Banking  ovemmenks  Banctivities  N  R-Square
Index  Index  Power  Requirements
Bank Development  0.189  -0.011  0.089  -0.042  0.002  -0.118  75  0.597
(0.004)  (0.725)  (0.003)  (0.172)  (0.939)  (0.001)
Net Interest Margin  0.042  -0.003  -0.010  0.000  0.003  0.004  75  0.264
(0.000)  (0.373)  (0.012)  (0.870)  (0.190)  (0.241)
Overhead Costs  0.032  0.001  -0.006  0.000  0.003  -0.001  75  0.201
(0.000)  (0.789)  (0.077)  (0.965)  (0.042)  (0.731)
Nonperforming Loans  0.074  -0.035  -0.042  0.004  0.006  -0.011  68  0.247
(0.063)  (0.058)  (0.007)  (0.799)  (0.586)  (0.567)
Capital  Private  Official  Entry into  Goverment-  Restrictions on
Dependent Variable  Constant'  Regulatory  Monitoring  Supervisory  Banking  ovemmenks  Banctivities  N  R-Square
Index  Index  Power  Requirements
Bank Development  0.232  -0.028  0.071  -0.029  -0.002  -0.169  -0.119  68  0.623
(0.000)  (0.428)  (0.025)  (0.322)  (0.926)  (0.154)  (0.002)
Net Interest Margin  0.041  -0.002  -0.009  -0.001  0.003  0.006  0.006  66  0.310
(0.000)  (0.660)  (0.045)  (0.713)  (0.156)  (0.760)  (0.075)
Overhead Costs  0.029  0.003  -0.004  0.000  0.004  0.022  0.000  66  0.298
(0.000)  (0.289)  (0.282)  (0.889)  (0.036)  (0.209)  (0.984)
Nonperforming Loans  0.029  -0.034  -0.028  -0.005  0.011  0.160  -0.021  63  0.318
(0.366)  (0.096)  (0.085)  (0.713)  (0.235)  (0.030)  (0.209)
Note: P-values in parentheses under the estimated coefficients, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors from an OLS regression.
Each row is a separate regression.
I Each regression also contains legal origin dummy variables (Common Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, and Socialist Law).
The following indices are principal component versions: Entry into Banking Requirements, Capital Regulatory Index, Restrictions on  Bank Activities, Private Monitoring Index,
Official Supervisory Power, Prompt Corrective Power.
61Table 8
Banking Crises Regressions
1  2*  3  4  5
N  52  46  43  51  40
Constant  -0.566  -0.210  -0.314  0.764  -2.732
(0.323)  (0.799)  (0.626)  (0.505)  (0.011)
Restrictions on Bank Activities  0.631  1.158  0.647  0.771  1.709
(0.073)  (0.016)  (0.174)  (0.083)  (0.034)
Entry into Banking Requirements  -0.183  -0.279  0.125  -0.309  -0.704
(0.495)  (0.381)  (0.614)  (0.350)  (0.142)
Capital Regulatory Index  -0.264  -0.749  -1.035  -0.155  -0.107
(0.471)  (0.173)  (0.069)  (0.735)  (0.885)
Private Monitoring Index  0.391  -0.016  0.169  1.168
(0.431)  (0.980)  (0.709)  (0.121)
Official Supervisory Index  -0.270  -0.224  -0.243  -0.655
(0.388)  (0.492)  (0.566)  (0.316)
Government-Owned Banks  2.312  5.269  2.846  1.537  3.414
(0.195)  (0.087)  (0.185)  (0.496)  (0.256)
Inflation  0.051  0.064  0.031  0.051  0.138
(0.084)  (0.009)  (0.168)  (0.051)  (0.010)
Moral Hazard Index  0.719
(0.000)
Diversification Index  -13.443
(0.012)
Diversification Index*Ln (GDP)  0.497
(0.014)
Limitations on Foreign Bank Entry/Ownership  1.911
(0.052)
Note: Each column gives complete logit results,
The P-values in parentheses under the estimated coefficients are based on  Huber/White robust standard errors.
* The sample for this regression is restricted to countries with some equity market activity, i.e., to countries where the IFC obtains trading data.
The following indices are principal component versions: Entry into Banking Requirements, Capital Regulatory Index, Restrictions on  Bank Activities, Private Monitoring Index,
Official Slipervisory Power, Prompt Corrective Power.
62Table  9
Moral  Hazard  Index  and Bank Crises:  Interaction  Terms
Dependent  Variable:  Major  Banking  Crisis
1  2  3  4  5
Constant  -0.314  -1.409  1.760  -0.308  -0.094
(0.626)  (0.345)  (0.450)  (0.637)  (0.905)
Restrictions  on Bank Activities  0.647  1.880  **  0.735  0.656  0.627
(0.174)  (0.043)  (0.265)  (0.168)  (0.193)
Entry into Banking  Requirements  0.125  0.398  0.249  0.127  0.164
(0.614)  (0.279)  (0.432)  (0.613)  (0.599)
Capital  Regulatory  Index  -1.035  *  -1.268  -1.075  **  -1.026  *  -1.201  *
(0.069)  (0.340)  (0.033)  (0.081)  (0.054)
Official  Supervisory  Index  -0.243  -1.190  -0.222  -0.246  -0.241
(0.566)  (0.224)  (0.598)  (0.567)  (0.582)
Government-Owned  Banks  2.846  9.477  3.963  2.761  2.869
(0.185)  (0.114)  (0.191)  (0.222)  (0.172)
Inflation  0.031  0.025  0.023  0.031  0.030
(0.168)  (0.307)  (0.232)  (0.176)  (0.179)
Moral  Hazard  Index  0.719  **  1.442  t  2.132  **  0.716  **  0.769  **
(0.000)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)
Moral Hazard  Indcx*Political  Openness  -0.513  *
(0.013)
Political  Openness  0.762
(0.141)
Moral  Hazard  Index*Rule  of Law  -0.288  **
(0.035)
Rule  of Law  -0.295
(0.535)
Moral Hazard  IndexOfficial Supervisory  Power  -0.031
(0.842)
Moral Hazard  Index*Capital  Regulatory  Index  -0.131
(0.600)
N  43  40  41  43  43
Note:  "  indicates  significant  at  the  0.05  level,  while  * indicates  significant  at  the  0.10  level.
Each  column  gives  complete  logit results  using  Huber/White  robust  standard  errors.
The  following  indices  are  principal  component  versions:  Entry  into Banking  Requirements,  Capital  Regulatory  Index,  Restrictions  on Bank  Activities,  Private  Monitoring  Index,
Official  Supervisory  Povwer,  Prompt  Corrective  Power.
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